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The United States Navy plans to decommission several
classes of warships in the next decade. Each of the major
Southern Cone countries of Latin America (Argentina, Brazil,
and Chile) perceives a geopolitically-driven need for a
blue-water navy. Each of these navies needs frigates and
destroyers to achieve blue-water status. This thesis
examines U.S. ship transfer policy to the Southern Cone. It
concludes that the Adams - . Coontz - . and Knox-class ships
that the U.S. navy is beginning to decommission should be
leased to the Southern Cone navies in order to bolster their
naval forces and to support mutual maritime security
interests. The poor economic status of these countries
mandates that the lease terms be made as favorable as
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A. PURPOSE AND ORGANIZATION
1. Major Research Questions
The United States Navy plans to decommission several
classes of warships over the next decade as its force is
cut. 1 These ships will be either placed into the inactive
reserve (mothballs); transferred to the Naval Reserve Force
(NRF); stricken from the Naval Vessel Register (NVR) and
used for spare parts or as a target; or designated as a
possible candidate for Foreign Military Sales (FMS).
At the same time, the navies of the Southern Cone of
Latin America 2 are also experiencing force cutbacks
primarily due to their weak economies. As the U.S. Navy
draws down concurrent with a subsiding Soviet global
security threat, it should remain capable of meeting its
worldwide commitments. The navies of Argentina, Brazil, and
Chile (the ABC countries), however, have not been capable in
the past, nor will they be able in the future, of performing
the types of missions required of them by their security
interests.
xThe U.S naval force will be cut from 565 to 425 ships by the
end of this decade according to a Congressional Budget Office study
cited in Jim Bencivenga, "US Navy Facing Changed Mission," The
Christian Science Monitor . 05 November 1991, 6.
2For the purposes of this paper, the Southern Cone is defined
to be Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. Although the Southern Cone is
generally defined as including Uruguay and Paraguay, these are
substantially smaller countries, with much smaller navies.
The United States has historically supplied the
Southern Cone navies with second-hand ships decommissioned
from the U.S. fleet. These navies are still today largely
composed of World War Two-era, U.S. -made ships. Transfers
of this type have generally had a political and military
benefit for both the United States and the respective
recipient.
This thesis examines the political, military, and
economic aspects of future U.S. warship transfers to the
Southern Cone . Its purpose is to recommend whether, and
under what conditions, the United States should transfer
ships from its recently decommissioned classes to the
Southern Cone . Specifically, should the United States sell
or lease Adams - . Coontz- . and Knox-class ships to the ABC
countries? Since World War II, the United States has
transferred large numbers of its older ships to the Southern
Cone. Most of these platforms were obsolete and of little
future value to the U.S. Navy. In almost all cases, the
transfers were not controversial. This thesis examines
whether, in light of the large number of ships it will
decommission in the coming decade, the United States should
once again adopt a policy of transferring significant
numbers of second-hand warships to the Southern Cone.
In this post-Cold War environment a reassessment must
be made as to whether transferring older warships to this
region is in the best interest of the United States. With
economic and social problems perhaps surpassing external
military security threats as priorities in these countries,
it is questionable whether it is in their best interest to
continue this policy.
My thesis is that it is in the best interest of the
United States to transfer Adams-. Coontz-. and Knox- class
ships to the Southern Cone. However, due to the absence of
a credible external maritime security threat, and because of
these countries' economic difficulties, the number of ships
transferred should be no more than one or two ships to a
particular country each year . The advantages of
transferring a limited number of these ships outweigh the
disadvantages. Transferring these ships enhances U.S.
national security interests, strengthens the military and
political ties between countries, and contributes to the
geopolitically-derived mission and effectiveness of these
navies during a period of decreasing naval budgets.
In order to develop sound arguments for future ship
transfer policy, a series of sequential questions are
addressed. First, are the Adams - . Coontz - . and Knox-class
ships the types of platforms required by the Southern Cone
navies? This question will be answered by classifying the
types of navies required by the geopolitical doctrines of
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, and then assessing the present
fleet status in each country. It will also examine the
reasons why the ABC navies are currently inconsistent with
the types of navies required by their stated geopolitical
doctrines. Finally, a ranking of the types of naval surface
vessels that are most needed by each navy is developed.
Second, considering the history of U.S. warship
transfers to the Southern Cone, what are the transfers
options that would be feasible in the future? The
feasibility of sales, leases, and coproduction are examined.
Third, what are the advantages and disadvantages for
the United States in transferring warships to the Southern
Cone?
Finally, considering the advantages and
disadvantages, what are the options for future U.S. warship
transfer policy to the Southern Cone? The final chapter
argues that it is in the best interest for the United States
to promote a limited number of ship transfers to the
Southern Cone in the future.
2. Organization of Study
The thesis is divided into two parts in addition to
the introduction (Chapter I) and the conclusion (Chapter X).
Part One (Chapters II-V) defines the types of ships that are
currently needed by each of the Southern Cone navies.
Chapter II examines the geopolitical doctrines of these
countries and how they affect naval force structure and
requirements. Chapter III compares the ABC naval order of
battle in 1980 and 1990 to describe trends that may affect
future force arrangements. Chapter IV examines the reasons
why the current order of battle of the ABC navies is
inconsistent with the force organization required by their
stated security interests. Chapter V looks at surface ships
the United States is decommissioning in the near future.
For each Southern Cone country, these U.S. warships are
ranked in order of need, af fordability , and desirability.
Part Two (Chapters VI-IX) analyzes the factors that
must be considered in deciding on a future ship transfer
policy towards the Southern Cone. Chapter VI outlines the
ship transfer process and appraises the various methods of
future ship transfer (i.e., sale, lease, or coproduction)
.
Chapters VII and VIII analyze the advantages and
disadvantages of ship transfers. Chapter IX describes three
future ship transfer policy options for the United States
and recommends one option as the best for future U.S.
strategy.
B. SCOPE OF STUDY AND DEFINITION OF TERMS
1. Scope of Study
This thesis focuses on the naval vessel categories
listed in Table I.B-1. It does not discuss, in any detail,
particular aircraft or weapon types. The reason it
concentrates solely on surface ships and submarines is
because naval aircraft (other than Maritime Reconnaissance)
and weapon systems are ship-based. In other words, a
country's acquisition of naval aircraft and weapon systems
is not significant unless its navy has the proper ship types
on which to base them.
Of the ships and submarines examined, this thesis
limits its analysis to the categories listed in Table I.B-1
because they comprise the major ship types that are used to
determine naval force classifications. Craft that are used
solely for riverine purposes, amphibious landing craft, and
surface ship tenders were omitted for this reason.
2. Definition of Terms
This section defines terms pertinent to the study of
naval ship transfers and then specifies the types of ships
examined in this thesis.
a. Classification of Ship Categories and Types
Table I.B-1 classifies ship type by tonnage and
mission and general category. These definitions will be
used throughout this paper.
TABLE I.B-1
SHIP CATEGORIES AND SHIP TYPES
SHIP CATEGORY SHIP TYPE .ABBREVIATION TONNAGE/MISSION
SUBMARINES SS a ASW/ASUW
PRINCIPAL Aircraft
SURFACE Carrier CV AAW.ASUW.ASW
COMBATANTS
Battleship BB Armor protected
>30,000/ASUW
Cruiser C,CG b >8.000/AAW,ASUW
Destroyer DD.DDG b 3-8,000/AAW.ASW
Frigate FF,FFG b <3,000/ASW
PATROL AND all ships and craft whose primary role
COASTAL relates to the protection of the sea




















bThe "G" indicates that ship is equipped with a
missile launcher
AAW - Anti-Air Warfare
ASUW - Anti-Surface Warfare
ASW - Anti-Submarine Warfare
Source: adapted from The Military Balance (London
Brassey's, 1989), 6.
b. Categories of Navies
This subsection categorizes navies by the types
and numbers of ships they have. Navies will be classified
as having coastal, brown, or blue water capabilities. It
uses definitions developed by Michael A. Morris in his work
Expansion of Third World Navies . 3
(1) Coastal Navy. This is what Morris defines as
an "offshore territorial defense navy." Its capabilities
include considerable offshore territorial defense up to
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) limits. 4 A costal navy
consists of at least six to fifteen principal surface
combatants and submarines.
(2) Brown Water Navy. This thesis equates a
brown water navy with what Morris describes as an "adjacent
force projection navy." Its capabilities include
"impressive territorial defense and some ability to project
force well beyond the EEZ". Helicopter operations can be
conducted from a number of ships. A brown water navy may
3Morris, Expansion of Third World Navies (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1987), 22-49. Note that these categories are
solely applied to Third World navies and are not intended to
provide criteria for evaluating superpower navies. For an
alternative, but looser definition, see Geoffrey Till, Modern Sea
Power (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1987), 47. Till
defines four categories of navies: global, blue water, regional,
and coastal.
4The EEZ extends from the 12 nautical mile (nm) territorial
sea limit out to 200 nm. See Morris, 10.
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have a cruiser and consists of more than fifteen principal
surface combatants and submarines.
(3) Blue Water Navy. For the purposes of this
study, a blue water navy is defined by what Morris calls a
"regional force projection navy." Its capabilities include
"impressive territorial defense and some ability to project
force in the adjoining ocean basin." Additionally, the navy
has an aircraft carrier capable of launching attack
aircraft. Many ships are capable of conducting at-sea
helicopter operations. A blue water navy probably has a
cruiser and consists of more than fifteen principal surface
combatants and submarines. A blue water navy has numerous
support ships including tankers capable of refueling at sea.
It is likely to have considerable amphibious force
projection capability, including the transport and landing
of troops, heavy equipment, and supplies.
C. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES
This thesis is based solely on unclassified sources. The
author conducted interviews with various key arms transfer
and Latin American experts during their visits to the Naval
Postgraduate School. The author also conducted a research
trip to Washington, D.C. in September 1991. This trip
included interviews with principal policy-makers in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), the Navy International
Programs Office (NIPO), and the Department of State.
The thesis uses a decision analysis methodology developed
by the author. First, a Southern Cone need for further ship
transfers is established. To determine the platform needs
of each navy, a method of weighted factor-analysis is
developed. 5 Geopolitical factors and current naval order-
of-battle are assessed. A table is presented for each navy
that assigns numerical values for each type of platform
(Tables III.A-6, III.B-7, and III.C-6). The value is used
as a weighted factor in ranking the desirability of U.S.
ships available for transfer. Ten other weighted-factors
are analyzed in Tables V.B-1 through V.B-7, one for each of
seven different platform types. The numerical values
assigned for each factor are subjectively the author's.
Other analysts may arrive at different numerical values.
The primary merit of this method is that it can be used
generically to assess ship transfer desirability from a
recipient's perspective for any navy in the world.
Next, a cost-benefit evaluation is conducted concerning
possible future ship transfers and the particular method of
transfer. Finally, a policy recommendation is made
5An alternate technique of assessing weighted factors can be
employed using the MS-DOS computer program Expert Choice (McLean,
Virginia: Decision Support Software, 1986). One limitation of this
program is that its analysis is limited to a maximum of seven
different main factors (ten factors are analyzed in Chapter V).
10
concerning the future transfer of decommissioned U.S. naval
warships to the Southern Cone.
11
XX . TYPES OF NAVIES REQUIRED BYSOUTHERN CONE GEOPOLITICS
This chapter examines the geopolitical thinking, themes,
and strategies of the ABC countries. Jack Child notes that
geopolitical thinking in relation to conflict analysis is
most prevalent and advanced in the military establishments
of three South American countries with a recent history of
military rule: Brazil, Argentina, and Chile ... These
currents of geopolitical thinking are beginning to have a
significant impact on national policies and the
international relations of the region. 6
This quote gives a sense of how important geopolitics is
to the ABC countries. ABC geopolitics is important
militarily because most geopolitical writers in the Southern
Cone are military officers or civilians linked to the armed
forces. 7 This chapter identifies maritime elements of
Southern Cone geopolitics in order to later determine how
closely ship acquisitions matched stated strategies during
the 1980s. 8
6See Jack Child, Geopolitics and Conflict in the Southern
Cone: Quarrels Among Neighbors (Boulder: Lynne Rienner , 1985
)
[hereinafter "Child(85 )
" ] . 4.
7See Jack Child, "Geopolitical Thinking," in Louis W. Goodman,
Johanna S.R. Mendelson, and Juan Rial (eds.) The Military and
Democracy (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1990)
[hereinafter "Child( 90 ) " ] . 144.
8The maritime geopolitical perspective stresses the concepts
of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and choke points. Control
of SLOCs implies control of commerce, trade, and movement of
military assets. Choke points, such as canals and straits, provide
the easiest location to control the SLOCs that pass through them.
See Child(85) , 24.
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This chapter is divided into three sections. The first
section concentrates on the maritime component of Southern
Cone geopolitics in order to determine the type of navy each
country requires vis-a-vis its geopolitical strategy. The
next section summarizes potential Southern Cone conflict
areas. Confrontation and friction have already occurred in
a few of these areas, while others have been peaceful to
date but could erupt into conflict at any time. The final
part of this chapter evaluates the type of navy required by
each country, as determined from geopolitical criteria.
A. SOUTHERN CONE GEOPOLITICS
1. Argentine Geopolitics
Argentine geopolitical thinking has long been
reactive towards its major regional threat, Brazil. It has
historically viewed Argentina as a country that has suffered
geopolitical aggression from Brazil, Chile, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. 9 It believes these
countries are collaborating to deny Argentina its destiny in
the Malvinas, the South Atlantic, and Antarctica. 10
Argentine geopolitical thinking is centered on two broad
topics: (1) the restoration of Argentina's rightful place
in the world and (2) drafting and implementing a "National
9Ibid., 42.
10Malvinas is the name Argentines call the Falkland Islands
13
Project" that will unify the country and enable it to
achieve its destiny of greatness. 11 Another Argentine
concern is the maintaining of territorial integrity. This
implies
protecting its continental area in South America, the
Malvinas, Georgias and Sandwich del Sur islands, the
Argentine Antarctic sector and the territorial seas, the
maritime economic areas and their respective continental
shelves . 12
The strategic maritime elements of Argentine
geopolitics are comprised in the concept of Atlantartida
.
which stresses the unity that the South Atlantic offers as
the body of water between mainland Argentina and Antarctica.
Atlantartida includes four main areas. First, it comprises
Antarctica, where Argentina feels it must solidify its
territorial claims in order to secure the rights to
potentially vast deposits of seafood, minerals, and oil.
Second, it includes the Malvinas Islands, which Argentina
sees as its gateway to Antarctica. Argentina believes it
must occupy them in order to neutralize British and Chilean
claims to Antarctica. 13 Third, it encompasses the South
Atlantic, which contains vast resources and serves as a SLOC
to Antarctica. Due to its geographical position, the
11Child(85), 41
12See Rear Admiral Mario Lanzarini, Argentine Navy, "Argentina
and the Sea," in Patrick Wall (ed.) The Southern Oceans and the




Argentine Republic has developed a considerable dependence
on South Atlantic waterways by which over ninety percent of
its foreign trade moves. 14 Last, Atlantartida consists of
the Beagle Channel islands, which Argentina views as the key
site for guarding the access from the Atlantic to the
Pacific, a role Argentina believes rightfully belongs to it.
2. Brazilian Geopolitics
The Brazilian school is the most significant in Latin
America because of its impact on contemporary Brazil and
because it has served as a model for others. It has also
produced strongly reactive geopolitical thinking, especially
in Argentina. 15
The single dominant characteristic of Brazilian
geopolitical thinking has been the emphasis towards
qrandeza . the Portuguese term for Brazil's ambition to
become the first Latin American superpower. From this
concept, Brazil derives a strategy similar to the Unites
States' Manifest Destiny, in that it feels it must extend
its continental presence through expansion and development.
14See Lanzarini, "Argentina and the Sea," 220
15Child(85), 34.
15
Argentina has been Brazil's major challenger and
primary security threat in the region. 16 Recently, however,
these two countries have made progress towards reducing
their rivalry and increasing cooperation. 17
Brazil maintains three major maritime geopolitical
themes. 18 First, Brazil considers the South Atlantic and
Atlantic Narrows to be a vital national interest. 19 Because
of Brazil's geographic position, nearly all of its foreign
trade is transported by sea, with only a small fraction
carried by land within South America. 20 Brazil increased in
international geopolitical significance when oil
supertankers, which could not transit the Suez canal, began
to travel around Africa's Cape Horn and then northward
16See Stanley E. Hilton, "The Brazilian Military: Changing
Strategic Perceptions and the Question of Mission," Armed Forces
& Society . Spring 1987, 332.
17The two countries have begun the process of economic
integration. See "Brazil and Partners Launch MERCOSUR," Latin
American Regional Reports: Brazil Report . 02 May 1991, 8. Also,
Brazil and Argentina together formally repudiated the manufacture
of nuclear weapons. See Shirley Christian, "Argentina and Brazil
Renounce Atomic Weapons," The New York Times . 29 November 1990, Al.
18For a detailed discussion of Brazilian geopolitical themes
in general, see Philip Kelly, "Traditional Themes of Brazilian
Geopolitics and the Future of Geopolitics in the Southern Cone,"
in Philip Kelly and Jack Child (eds) Geopolitics of the Southern
Cone and Antarctica (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1988) [this book
hereinafter referred to as "Kelley and Child"], 111-122.
19The Atlantic Narrows is between the Brazilian northeast
salient and southwestern corner of the northwest bulge of Africa.
20See Domingos P.C.B. Ferreira, The Navv of Brazil: An
Emerging Power at Sea (Washington, D.C.: National Defense
University, 1983), 18.
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through the South Atlantic. There has been discussion, off
and on, of the formation of a South Atlantic Treaty
Organization (SATO) in which Brazil's navy would play a
important role. 21 Also, Brazil has expanded its export
market to West Africa and thus treats the South Atlantic as
vital to its economic livelihood. 22 There has been a long
tradition of strong affinity between both sides of the South
Atlantic. 23
Second, Antarctica is considered a vital interest, as
it is in Argentina. The interest is relatively recent, with
Brazil promoting its own Antarctic claim formula. 24 Brazil
has conducted Antarctic expeditions and appears committed to
maintaining a presence there.
21See Ren6 Luria, "The Brazilian Armed Forces: Budgets and
Ambitions Diverge," International Defense Review . July 1989, 933.
22By 1985, Brazil was Nigeria's second-largest trading
partner. It has also established trade ties with Angola and
Mozambique. See Armin K. Ludwig, "Two Decades of Brazilian
Geopolitical Initiatives and Military Growth," Air University
Review
. July-August 1986, 62.
23Primarily due to three factors: (1) geographic proximity;
(2) political, economic and military ties established by the
Portuguese among their Atlantic colonies; and (3) three centuries
of slave traffic from Africa to Brazil heavily influenced Brazilian
culture and racial composition. See Ferreira, 15.
24This concept, known as the frontage theory, argues that each
South American nation should have a sector of Antarctica defined
by the eastern and western-most longitudinal meridians of its
territory that are not obstructed by a southerly neighbor. See
Child(85), 37-38.
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Last, Brazil's maritime interests include protection
of its EEZ. 25 Protecting its 5,000 mile coastline is a
challenging task for the Brazilian navy. One of Brazil's
most powerful national interests is the search for energy
self-sufficiency in order to support its industrial growth.
Brazil's EEZ contains significant energy-producing oil
fields. Currently importing much more oil than it produces,
Brazil desires to exploit its offshore oil reserves as much
as possible. These facilities would require additional
maritime protection by naval forces. 26
3. Chilean Geopolitics
General Pinochet, Chile's leader from 1973 to 1989,
is the country's most influential geopolitical thinker.
Historically, a major theme has been a defense of its
territorial gains won in the War of the Pacific. 27 More
25Brazil joined the 200 nm EEZ crusade due to its rising
interest in SLOCs and a national campaign to diversify export
markets. See Hilton, 335.
26Michael A. Morris, International Politics and the Sea; The
Case of Brazil (Boulder: Westview, 1979), 252.
27The War of the Pacific (1879-1883) was a conflict between
Chile, Peru, and Bolivia. Chile quickly achieved naval supremacy
allowing for a decisive land engagement. Peru lost an entire
coastal province and Bolivia lost its only access to the Atlantic
ocean.
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recently, however, Chile's geopolitical interests have
focused on Argentina. 28
Chile, more than any other country in Latin America,
depends on the sea. 29 Chile's geopolitical doctrine
contains four major maritime components. First, is its
interest in Antarctica. As with Argentina, Chile subscribes
to a tri-continental archipelago theme that is based on
preeminence over its coastline, the Magellan southern tip
and its oceanic islands in order to strengthen its SLOCs to
its Antarctica territory. 30 Chilean society strongly
believes, as the southernmost country in the world, in its
right to Antarctic claims. Chile fears Antarctica will
become a future theater of international rivalries. 31
Second, Chile views itself as the gatekeeper to the
Atlantic. As in Argentina, the Beagle Channel islands play
a strategic geographic role. Chile wants to control this
waterway in order to have unrestricted access to the
28For a detailed study of Chilean geopolitics and how it
differs from the other Southern Cone countries, see Howard T.
Pittman, "From O'Higgins to Pinochet: Applied Geopolitics in
Chile," in Kelly and Child, 173-183.
29See Robert L. Scheina, "The Chilean Navy," United States
Naval Institute Proceedings . March 1988 [hereinafter
"Scheina(88) M ] , 32.
30See Rodolfo Codina and Gustavo Jordan, "The Chilean Navy Is
On Patrol, United States Naval Institute Proceedings . March 1990,
62.
31See David S. Harvey, "Southern Cone Strategy: The View From
Santiago," Defense & Foreign Affairs . July 1985, 17.
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Atlantic and to consolidate its Antarctic interests.
Another reason why this route is important to Chile is
because of the possibility of increased shipping through it
if the Panama canal were to close down. 32
Chile's third primary maritime concern is the South
Pacific, where it sees itself as a manager of the
circulation and use of the area's resources. 33 Chile's
claim to several South Pacific islands, including Easter
Island, provide bases from which it can control SLOCs into
Antarctica. 34
Last, Chile's maritime security interests includes
protecting its EEZ that it feels is being exploited by
Soviet and East European trawlers.
This section has outlined the maritime-related
geopolitical interests of the ABC countries. The next
subsection briefly outlines Southern Cone areas of conflict
32Ibid.
33See C6sar N. Caviedes, "The Emergence and Development of
Geopolitical Doctrines in the Southern Cone Countries," in Kelly
and Child, 20.
34Chile is currently building a shipping port at Easter
Island. It already has a runway that was recently enlarged after
Chile authorized the United States to use it for emergency space
shuttle landings. See Codina, 62-63 and Heraldo Muhoz and Carlos
Portales, Elusive Friendship: A Survey of U.S. -Chilean Relations
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991), 68.
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B. SOUTHERN CONE MARITIME AREAS OF CONFLICT
This section summarizes six areas of potential conflict
for one or more of the ABC countries. The six areas are:
(1) Beagle Islands; (2) Malvinas Islands; (3) South
Atlantic; (4) Antarctica; (5) South Pacific; and (6) EEZ
and Law of the Sea. A brief background is provided on each
area, including historical hostilities that have occurred.
The section ends by determining the types of navies required
by each Southern Cone country based on its geopolitical
doctrine and maritime-related interest areas. Determining
naval force composition requirements in this way results in
an ideal navy and does not, for instance, take into account
economic af fordability. Chapter four discusses some of the
reasons why the force structure of these navies are
different from the ideal.
Table II.B-1 displays the results of a study performed by
Jack Child in which he surveyed geopolitical journal
articles published by Southern Cone authors. 35 The raw
number of journal articles about a specific geopolitical
subject provides insight as to which geopolitical interests
were most important for a given period. Not surprisingly,
for the period from 1982 to 1986, the Malvinas Islands
appeared as the subject of the most journal articles. The
table also indicates the total number of journal articles
35See Child(90), 146-158.
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published per subject for the period 1947 to 1986. The
South Atlantic has been the most published topic since 1947,
Studying this table reveals that for all topics except
Argentina-Brazil, a significant portion of the total number
of articles on each subject has been published in the four
year period from 1982 to 1986. This indicates a fairly
recent increase in the importance of geopolitical thinking.
TABLE II.B-1









2. South Atlantic 37
3. Antarctica 31
4. South Pacific 15
5. Beagle Channel 12
6. Argentina-Brazil 2
1. South Atlantic 69
2. Antarctica 68
3. Malvinas Islands 59
4. Beagle Channel 43
5. South Pacific 31
6. Argentina-Brazil 30
Source: adapted from Jack Child, "Geopolitical
Thinking," in Louis W. Goodman, Johanna S.R. Mendelson
and Juan Rial (eds.) The Military and Democracy
(Lexington: Lexington Books, 1990), 150.
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1. The Beagle Channel 36
The three Beagle islands of concern are normally
uninhabited. 37 In late 1978, Argentina and Chile nearly
went to war over the claim to the islands. Both countries
want these islands because each believes that they support
Antarctic access. The roots of the conflict are partially
based on Chile's claim that it had been cheated out of
Patagonia when the Argentine-Chilean border was fixed.
Another reason Chile wants them is because they give Chile a
clear access to the Atlantic Ocean. To Argentina, this
violates the long standing bi-oceanic principal with
Argentina as the keeper of the Atlantic and Chile the keeper
of the Pacific. Also at issue is where the boundary between
the two oceans should be delimited.
Before open hostilities erupted, Argentina requested
that the Vatican negotiate a demilitarized zone and this
effectively defused the immediate crisis, although the
dispute continued.
36Unless otherwise indicated, source for this subsection is
Child(85), 77-84. See also Robert L. Scheina, Latin America; A
Naval History (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1987), 184-187.
37The three primary islands are Nueva, Picton, and Lennox;
there are also three secondary islands that figure in the dispute:
Evout, Barnevelt, and Deceit.
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Chile did not openly support Argentina during the
1982 Malvinas war. 38 This created increased tensions
between the countries. Finally, in 1985, Argentina and
Chile signed the Vatican-mediated Treaty of Peace and
Friendship that granted the disputed islands to Chile, but
limited Chile's Atlantic claims that one would expect from




Recently, there have been signs of easing tensions
between the two countries over the islands. 40 Jack Child
notes, however, that
an important group of highly nationalistic Argentine
geopolitical writers continues to insist that the issue is
not dead, that Argentina was cheated, and that the
geopolitical implications of the problem for Argentina's
38During the war, a British helicopter crashed in Chilean
territory, proving to many Argentines that Chile was collaborating
with Britain.
39Chile's sovereignty was extended south from the islands to
Cape Horn. Chile also gained maritime jurisdiction over a 12 nm
zone surrounding the islands, in which Argentina would only be able
to exercise free navigation. Argentina was given maritime
jurisdiction outside the 12 nm, thus preserving its control over
the Atlantic area near the islands as well as jurisdiction over the
eastern mouth of the Strait of Magellan. See G. Pope Atkins, Latin
America in the International Political System (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1989), 317.
40In July 1989, the Chilean and Argentine navies held a joint
search and rescue exercise in the disputed channel. See Robert L.
Scheina, "Latin American Navies," United States Naval Institute
Proceedings . March 1989 [hereinafter "Scheina( 89 ) " ] , 128. The two
countries also recently reached an historic reconciliation that
settled 23 long-standing border disputes. See "Aylwin and Menem
to Sign Border Accord," Financial Times . 01 August 1991.
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In sum, the Beagle Island dispute, although officially
resolved, could still be a potential zone of conflict in the
future
.
Because the Beagle Islands and Beagle Channel are
located adjacent to the Magellan peninsula, the type of
navies needed to defend them would need to be coastal and
perhaps brown-water capable.
2. The Malvinas Islands 42
The country that possesses these South Atlantic
islands is in a strong position to project power into the
South Atlantic and Antarctica. Control of the Malvinas
strengthens sovereignty claims and increases a country's
influence in the area. 43
Argentina's military government was in political and
economic trouble when it initiated the 1982 war with
Britain. It hoped that the war would preoccupy citizens who
were becoming restless. The strategy was to rally the
41See Child(90) , 154.
42Background for section adapted from Child(85), 112-122; and
Atkins, 313-317.
43For a detailed discussion concerning British and Argentine
geopolitics surrounding the Malvinas conflict, see Leslie W.
Hepple, "The Geopolitics of the Falklands/Malvinas and the South
Atlantic: British and Argentine Perceptions, Misperceptions , and
Rivalries," in Kelly and Child, 223-236.
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country around a historically frustrating situation. The
British have controlled these islands since 1832. Beginning
with Juan Per6n in the 1940s, the Malvinas have been a
patriotic rallying point. Argentines have viewed possession
of the islands as necessary in order for the country to
fulfill its destiny of greatness.
The Argentine navy did not fare well in the
conflict. 44 The cruiser General Belqrano was sunk by
British submarine-fired torpedoes and the ex-United States
Guppy class diesel submarine Santa Fe was attacked by shore-
based helicopters and ended up beached. After these two
losses, the navy retired to secure coastal waters and the
rest of the navy's wartime participation was limited to
naval air operations. 45
The Malvinas Island are located about 300 nautical
miles from the Argentine mainland. Both a viable brown and
blue water navy are required to project power into the area
for extended periods. Subsequent to the 1982 conflict,
Britain has established a 150 nautical mile protective zone
around the islands in which all Argentine military and
44For an excellent account of the military aspects of the war,
see Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle For the Falklands
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1983).
45See Scheina, Latin America; A Naval History 1810-1987 . 253.
26
civilian ships and aircraft are forbidden. 6 Tensions have
eased somewhat as Britain has recently moved to reestablish
military ties, largely due to Argentina's Gulf War
participation. An Argentine naval attache has been
restationed in London and Britain is again making available
supply parts for British-made naval equipment. 47
3. South Atlantic 48
The strategic importance of the South Atlantic 49
increased significantly since 1970 for two main reasons. 50
First, it was used increasingly by supertankers bringing oil
around Cape Horn. 51 Second, the Soviets expanded their West
46See Robert L. Scheina, "Latin American Navies," United
States Naval Institute Proceedings , March 1987 [hereinafter
"Scheina(87)
" ] , 36.
47See Jimmy Burns and David White, "Argentina and Britain
Resume Military Links," Financial Times . 23 March 1991.
48Background for this subsection derived from Child(85), 122-
130.
49For a detailed analysis see Carlos de Meira Mattos, "The
Strategic Importance of the South Atlantic," in Kelly and Child,
214-222.
50For a discussion on the South Atlantic's importance to the
United States vis-a-vis its policy towards the Southern Cone, see
Lars Schoultz, National Security and United States Policy Toward
Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University, 1987), 195-199.
51For a world perspective on the shift in oil supply routes,
see Geoffrey Kemp, "The New Strategic Map," Survival . March/April
1977, 52 and 54-55.
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African presence to include Angola. 52 Proposals for
developing a South Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO) to
counter the Soviet South Atlantic threat were never
fruitful. 53 Argentina was the strongest Latin American
proponent of SATO, but Brazil withheld support because of
South Africa's Apartheid government. 54 The recently-signed
peace agreement in Angola and the imminent fall of Apartheid
in South Africa have yet to prompt any renewed interest in a
SATO-type organization.
Jack Child describes the South Atlantic's military
significance to the Southern Cone:
It is an important arena in which to project power in an
attempt to secure expanded exclusive economic zones and
improve their Antarctic claims. The navies, in
particular, have a strong vested interest in focusing
national attention into these areas since it gives them a
justification for expanding their roles and their budget
and equipment demands. 55
"For a discussion on the Soviet presence in the South
Atlantic and Antarctica, see A.J. Tellis, "Latin America's Navies:
A Strategic Survey," Naval Forces . Vol. 8 No. 2 1987, 216.
53SAT0 membership would have included Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, and South Africa. The SATO concept was derived as a
supplement to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) which
only covered Atlantic waters south to the tropic of Cancer. The
SATO subject is occasionally revived by Southern Cone geopolitical
analysts. There does exist a sub-regional organization, the South
Atlantic Maritime Regional Command (CAMAS) comprised by Argentina,
Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Its influence is confined to
coastal shipping routes. See Child(85), 124.
54Pamela J. McNaught, The United States, the South Atlantic.
and Antarctica: Interests and Challenges (Monterey: Naval
Postgraduate School Thesis, 1990), 33.
55Child(85), 127.
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The collapse of the Soviet Union has decreased the external
maritime threat to the South Atlantic. In 1986, the General
Assembly of the United Nations declared the South Atlantic
to be a zone of peace and cooperation. 56 A naval capability
is still required, however, to ensure future regional
conflicts in South America and southern Africa do not
disrupt maritime trade.
In order to effectively project power into the South
Atlantic, a blue water navy is required. A resupply





The Antarctic Treaty is the prevailing document
concerning international conduct on the continent. It could
have been, but will not, be revised in 1991. A revision
conference would have been convened if any of the
56This declaration was largely due to Brazilian diplomatic
efforts. See Eduardo I. Pesce, "Brazil's Navy Must Wait," United
States Naval Institute Proceedings , March 1987 [hereinafter
"Pesce(87)" ] , 138.
57See Morris, Expansion of Third World Navies . 215-228
58Background for this section derived from Child(85), 131-143.
Perhaps the most authoritative work on the subject to date is Jack
Child, Antarctica and South American Geopolitics: A Frozen
Lebensraum (New York: Praeger, 1988) [hereinafter "Child( 88 ) " ]
.
See also Jack Child, "South American Geopolitics and Antarctica:
Confrontation or Cooperation?," in Kelly and Child, 187-202; and
Margaret L. Clark, "Cooperation on Ice: The Potential of
Collaboration in the Southern Cone," in Kelly and Child, 203-213.
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consultative parties had called for changes to the original
treaty. 59 The Antarctic continent and surrounding waters
are rich in resources, including krill, oil, natural gas,
minerals and fresh water. 60 It is also located in a
strategic position near several of the world's straits,
including the Drake passage.
Open hostilities have already occurred. In 1983,
Brazil mounted its first Antarctic expedition. 61 The
expedition was intercepted by both Argentine warships and
59The Antarctic political administration is divided into four
groups-. (1) the twelve original consultative parties who have had
an historical presence and see themselves as the principal powers
in future negotiations. Both Argentina and Chile belong to this
group; (2) later consultative parties signed the treaty after 1961;
(3) acceding parties have signed the treaty but have not yet
qualified to become consultative members. Brazil is an acceding
member; and (4) seven claimants among the twelve original
consultative members that hold pre-treaty claims. See Child(85),
133-134; also Atkins, 340-342. For a detailed discussion of the
Antarctic Treaty, see Jeffrey D. Myhre, The Antarctic Treaty
System: Politics. Law, and Diplomacy (Boulder: Westview, 1986).
60The United Nations recently endorsed a ban on future mining
in Antarctica. Currently, there are no commercial mining ventures
underway or scheduled. Forty-five countries, including all three
ABC nations and the United States, were purposely absent to show
their resistance towards any moves to give the U.N. the final
authority to decide on the future of the continent. See Rodolfo
A. Windhausen, "UN Endorses Ban on Mining," The Times of the
Americas , 26 December 1990, 30. For more on how the Antarctic
Treaty addresses protection of marine environment and minerals, see
Gillian D. Triggs (ed.), The Antarctic Treaty Regime: Law.
Environment and Resources (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1987).
61It was important that Brazil, as only an acceding party,
conduct a mission because the terms of the 1961 treaty stipulate
that only countries that have sent at least one expedition by 1991
will be allowed to attend future treaty negotiations.
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British fighter aircraft before it finally entered Antarctic
waters
.
In October 1991, a development occurred that may
serve to defuse future conflicts over the right to exploit
Antarctic resources. After two years of negotiations,
twenty-six nations signed a fifty-year ban on oil
exploration and mining on the continent. The convention
designates Antarctica as a natural reserve. It also
specifies that its delicate ecology should be protected and
establishes ways to judge the impact of human activity on
the continent. These bans will not officially take effect,
however, until all twenty-six signing nations ratify the
document, which is expected to take at least two years. 62
As world resources dwindle, the future possibility exists
that a resource-poor country may challenge this ban
militarily.
In order to maintain SLOCs open from the ABC
countries to Antarctica, both a brown and a blue water navy
is required.
5. South Pacific
Chile envisions itself as a South Pacific power. It
considers that the South Pacific, from Easter Island to its
62Richard Lorant, "Antarctic Pact Puts Continent Off Limits to
Oil Drilling, Mining," Monterey Herald (Associated Press), 05
October 1991, 2A.
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coast, is a Chilean Sea or Chilean Lake. 63 Chile's main
challenger to this claim is Peru, a rivalry dating back to
the War of the Pacific. 64 Recent Chilean geopolitical
writings warn of the dangers of Soviet and Cuban naval
penetration of the South Pacific region. 65
The current probability of conflict in the South
Pacific is low. Peru, Chile's most likely threat, is too
preoccupied with internal crises to challenge Chilean naval
power. A general criticism of Chilean South Pacific
geopolitical writing is that it exaggerates the strategic
value of one of the least trafficked segments of all
oceans 66
As the only Southern Cone country to have a
significant interest in the South Pacific, Chile needs brown
and blue water naval capability. This level of maritime
force is necessary to project power from the Chilean coast
to Easter Island, some 2,300 nm in distance.
63See Child(88) , 165.
64Peru has the largest and most sophisticated submarine force
in Latin America.
"See Child(90) , 154.
"See Caviedes in Kelly and Child, 22.
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6. Exclusive Economic Zone and Law of the Sea 67
As early as 1947, Chile had laid claims to a 200 nm
off-shore territorial limit. Together with Ecuador and
Peru, Chile issued a declaration in 1952 stating that the
rationale for the limit was that
offshore food and economic materials were essential
national resources and that they had the right and duty to
protect and regulate them against outside exploitation. 68
Brazil joined Chile in declaring its own EEZ shortly
afterward. In 1982, all three ABC countries ratified the
Law of the Sea Convention that establishes a 200 nm EEZ for
coastal nations, including a clause concerning oil-drilling
rights. 69 It regulates shipping lanes and provides for
rights of passage for civilian and military ships through
straits, and guarantees free navigation for naval forces.
This includes Brazil's concern for keeping the Amazon
waterway system open. Also, the law limits seabed mining
and exploitation of fishing areas. 70
Conflict over EEZs has a historical basis within the
Southern Cone. In 1963, Brazilian warships seized three
"For an overview of Third World naval interest in the EEZ,
see Harold J. Kearsley, "The Small Navy's Role," Navy
International . October 1988, 466-467.
68Atkins, 343.
"For a detailed discussion of the EEZ, see Morris, Expansion
of Third World Navies . 132-143; also Geoffrey Till, Modern Sea
Power (London: Brassey's, 1987), 18-21.
7CAtkins, 345-346.
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French lobster boats sixty miles off the Brazilian coast.
In response, France sent a destroyer and Brazil countered
with a cruiser, five destroyers and two corvettes. 71 A
compromise was reached before actual shots were fired.
Also, in 1966, an Argentine destroyer shot and hit a Russian
trawler when the trawler disobeyed naval instructions.
Between September and October 1977, the Argentine navy
engaged Soviet and Bulgarian trawlers with guns, resulting
in some casualties. 72
Of the six conflict areas examined, the EEZ probably
has the most potential for future confrontation. In order
to adequately protect and project power throughout the
200 nm zone, a country requires all three types of navies:
coastal, brown and blue water.
Of the other five areas of conflict discussed, the
probability of future conflict is highest in Antarctica,
followed by the Beagle Channel, the Malvinas Islands, the
South Atlantic and the South Pacific. As political
relations between belligerents improve, conflict in the
Beagle Channel and Malvinas Islands becomes less likely.
Successful long-term SLOC interdiction of the South Atlantic
and South Pacific could only be realistically accomplished
by the United States Navy, although regional conflicts may
71These confrontations are now known as the "Lobster wars."
See Scheina, Latin American: A Naval History . 182.
72Ibid. , 182-183.
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temporarily interrupt trade. In sum, the traditional
geopolitical conflicts of the Southern Cone are becoming
less likely to be areas of contention in the future,
although none of the conflicts discussed is completely
resolved.
This chapter has surveyed six potential areas of
maritime conflict in the southern cone. By combining the
geopolitical doctrines and the potential areas of conflict
for each of the ABC countries, the type of navy each country
requires can easily be determined. Table II.B-2 summarizes
the type of navy each country needs for each of the seven
main interest areas.
TABLE II.B-2
TYPES OF NAVIES REQUIRED BY PRIMARY
SOUTHERN CONE MARITIME GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS
(In order of decreasing probability of future conflict)
GEOPOLITICAL PRIMARY INTEREST OF: TYPE OF NAVY
INTEREST ARG BRZ CHL REQUIRED
1. EEZ yes yes yes coastal/brown/
blue
2. Antarctica yes yes yes brown/blue
3. Beagle Channel yes no yes coastal/brown
4. Malvinas Islands yes no no brown/blue
5. South Atlantic yes yes no blue
6. South Pacific no no yes blue
Source: compiled by author
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XXX . SOUTHERN CONE NAVIES AND
SHIP ACQUISITIONS . 1980-1990
This chapter examines the navies of each of the Southern
Cone countries. It begins by looking at the type of navy
present in 1980 and then tracks naval ship acquisitions,
domestic shipbuilding, and ships decommissioned over the
decade. It then studies the type of navy each country had
in 1990 and analyzes the changes between the 1980 and 1990
navies. After checking on any planned acquisitions or
domestic shipbuilding in progress, a matrix is employed to
determine and rank the types of ships each country needs to





1. Argentine Navy, 1980
Argentina's navy in 1980 was one of the strongest
third world navies. Morris places it among only four
regional force projection navies in the third world. 74 On
paper, it qualified as a blue water navy. It was a very old
fleet, however. It had one aircraft carrier commissioned in
the 1940s, one cruiser of pre-World War Two vintage, and
73For a general overview of the needs of Third World navies,
see Christopher Dawson, "Changing Requirements of Third World
Navies," International Defense Review . October 1986, 1477-1486.
74See Morris, Expansion of Third World Navies , 34.
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seven destroyers with a hull life of thirty-two years or
more. In all, sixty-one percent of its fleet had been
commissioned before 1950.
Subsequent to World War Two, the Argentine Navy was
dependent on United States military assistance. By 1980,
fifty-two percent of its ships were originally from the
American navy. Most of these were considered obsolete by
the United States before they were transferred. 75 Only
thirteen percent were from Argentine shipyards. Table
III.A-1 summarizes the Argentine navy of 1980.
75Note that obsolescence only means that the technology
present in these ships had been surpassed by what was available at
the time; it does not necessarily mean that the platforms were








ACTIVE NAVAL FLEET 46
PRINCIPAL COMBATANTS: 17 (37%)
Submarines: 4 (4f)





PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS: 19 (41%)
Patrol Ships 8 (3d, 5f)
Fast Attack Craft (Gun) 2 (2f)
Fast Attack Craft (Torp.) 2 (2f)
Coastal Patrol Craft 4 (4f)
Large Patrol Craft 3 (Id, 2f)
AMPHIBIOUS: 5 (11%)
Landing Ships (Tank) 4 (Id, 3f)
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fc-domestic construction under foreign contract
aincludes both f and fc
Source: adapted from John Moore (ed.) Jane's Fighting
Ships. 1980-1981 (London: Jane's, 1980), 23-33.
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2. Argentine Ship Acquisitions. 1980-1990
Argentina successfully procured five different ship
types from foreign sources during the 1980s. Germany
delivered ten of the twelve total units contracted.
Additionally, Germany has six vessels under contract for
future delivery.
Germany delivered the first of two TR 1700 SS units
in December 1984. Four additional units are under contract
for domestic construction. The Domceq Garcia shipyard's
construction program for these $200 million vessels was
already more than two years behind schedule in early 1989. 76
These submarines close the gap between the older generation
of diesel boats and the newer nuclear-powered attack
submarines. 77 One observer's view of these boats:
Beyond any doubt, the TR1700...is a "diesel submariner's
dream," as it is vastly superior to any other conventional
submarine currently in service and possesses operational
characteristics close to those of a nuclear submarine. 78
The addition of these vessels clearly elevates Argentina's
submarine force capabilities over its older 1970s vintage
Balta - Class Type 209 diesel submarines.
76See Joe Schneider, "Crisis in Argentina's Forces," Jane '
s
Defence Weekly . 29 April 1989, 745.
77See Robert L. Scheina, "Latin American Navies", United
States Naval Institute Proceedings , March 1985 [hereinafter
"Scheina(85)" ] , 35.
78See Keith E. Wixler, U.S. Navy, "Argentina's Geopolitics and





Germany also constructed and delivered four MEKO 360
type destroyers (the last unit was delivered in April 1985).
These are gas-turbine propelled, and carry Exocet surface-
to-surface missiles (SSM), five inch guns, and torpedoes.
They normally carry SA319B Alouete helicopters for ASW and
ASUW missions.
France delivered the last of three type A69 diesel
powered frigates in July 1981. 79 These are outfitted with
Exocet SSM, 3.9 inch guns, torpedoes and hull-mounted sonar.
Four MEKO 140 diesel frigates were constructed in Rio
Santiago under contract from Germany. The ships were
commissioned between 1985 and 1990. Two more units are
under domestic construction. 80 These vessels carry Exocets,
one three inch gun, torpedoes, and medium frequency hull-
mounted sonar and are mostly used for EEZ patrol duties.
A United States-constructed oil rig support tug was
purchased from the U.S. maritime Administration in 1987 for
use as a survey and oceanographic patrol ship. The
significance of this transfer is that it signals the
reopening of equipment deliveries to Argentina from the
79The first two were originally built for the South African
navy, but were purchased instead by Argentina following the world-
wide embargo on arms sales to South Africa.
80Budget restrictions have recently forced construction of
these last two units to be suspended. It is likely these vessels
will only be completed if a foreign buyer can be found for them.
See David Foxwell, "World Warshipbuilding: The Decade of the
Multipurpose Combatant," International Defense Review , August 1991,
852.
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United States. Table III.A-2 summarizes Argentine ship
acquisitions during the 1980s.
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TABLE III.A-2
ARGENTINE SHIP ACQUISITIONS, 1980-1990
SUBMARINES
TR 1700 Type (Diesel ) --GERMANY
(2) German built-delivered in 1984, 1985
(4) Under contract for domestic construction
DESTROYERS
MEKO 360 Type (Gas Turbine ) --GERMANY
(4) German built-delivered in 1983, 1984
FRIGATES
Type A69 (Diesel ) --FRANCE
(1) French built-delivered in 1981
MEKO 140 Type ( Diesel ) --GERMANY
(4) Domestically constructed (foreign contract)
1985-1990
(2) Under contract for domestic construction
PATROL SHIPS
Teniente Class (Diesel ) --UNITED STATES
(1) United States built-delivered in 1987
SUMMARY
12 Vessels delivered 6 Vessels under contract
Germany 10 Germany 6
France 1
United States 1
Source: adapted from Richard Sharpe (ed.) Jane '
s
Fighting Ships. 1990-1991 (Surrey: Jane's, 1990), 9-
16.
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3. Domestic Naval Ship Construction, 1980-1990
There were no domestic programs other than those
mentioned in part two (construction of foreign-designed
vessels )
.
4. Ships Decommissioned or Lost, 1980-1990
The Argentine navy decommissioned and lost a total of
twenty-four craft during the decade. The most significant
was the loss of the sole Argentine cruiser. General
Belqrano , to a British submarine-launched torpedo. Seven
old U . S . -constructed destroyers were mothballed. 81 One area
that has been degraded is Argentina's support ship and oil
tanker inventory. Without the ability to refuel at sea, a
navy with blue water potential is relegated to brown water
status at best. Table III.A-3 summarizes the ships removed
from service during the 1980s.
81Not included in the analysis was the loss of the polar
transport Bahia Paraiso in January 1989. The vessel struck a
submerged rock in the Straits of Bismarck and sustained severe
damage. The ship had limited ice-breaking capability and was used
during the Malvinas war as a hospital ship. See Robert L. Scheina,
"Latin American Navies," United States Naval Institute Proceedings
.
March 1990 [hereinafter "Scheina( 90 ) " ] , 111.
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TABLE III.A-3





























LARGE PATROL (1 1 Argentine-built 1951
(1 Ex-US 63ft AVR NA
(1 Spanish built 1977
LSTs (3 Ex-US 1945
LSD (1 1 Ex-US 1943
TANKERS (1 US built 1950
(1 Ex-US "Klickitat" 1945
(1 Argentine built 1938
aSanta Fe destroy ed in Malvinas war
bGeneral Belq rano sunk in Malvinas war
Source: adapted from Richard Sharpe (ed.) Jane ' s
Fighting Ships. 1990-1991 (Surrey: Jane's, 1990), 9-
16.
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5. Argentine Navy. 1990
The main mission of the 1990 Argentine navy is
exercising local sea control in sea areas contiguous to the
mainland. 82 The aircraft carrier Veinticinco de Mayo began
an overhaul in 1988. Its steam plant is to be replaced by a
diesel propulsion system. The original two-year shipyard
period has been extended and the program has reportedly
experienced budgetary delays. 83 Nevertheless, modernization
of this vessel remains the Argentine navy's top priority. 84
The naval and armed forces budgets experienced a
general decline over the decade. 85 In his first defense
budget, President Carlos Menem in 1989 appropriated over
half of the $580 million total to the air force, even though
the army had traditionally received the largest portion,
followed by the navy. 86 Menem recently declared that all
funds raised through the privatization of defense
corporations will be set aside for the armed forces. 87
82See Tellis, 214.
83If completed, the ship's new top speed will be approximately
25 knots, fast enough to launch the Super Entendard attack aircraft
that are replacing aging A-4 Skyhawks. See Scheina(90), 111; Jane ' s
Defence Weekly . 22 October 1988, 999.
84See Jane's Defence Weekly . 05 January 1991, 6.
85Military spending dropped from an average of 4.3 percent
gross national product (GNP) in the early 1980s to 2.5 percent in
1989. See Schneider, 745.
86See Scheina(90), 111.
87Jane's Defence Weekly . 05 January 1991, 6.
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Severe financial problems have forced Argentina to offer two
of the locally built TR 1700 submarines for sale. 88
Argentina's two British-made Type 42 destroyers have been up
for sale for several years due to an inability to acquire
spare parts from Britain, but there have been no buyers as
yet. 89 Perhaps the most serious ramification of a shortage
of naval funds is that Argentine ships are not getting
sufficient time at sea. Budgetary restrictions have limited
major units to two weeks sea time per year since 1984. 90
Argentina had several ships deployed at the end of
1990. The frigates Almirante Brown and Spiro were part of
the U.S. -led blockade of Iraq. 91 Also, all four of its
Israeli Dabur - class patrol boats are loaned to the United
Nations peacekeeping force in Nicaragua. 92
Argentina's off-and-on nuclear submarine program is
apparently back on. It is possible that two Type 209/1200
88See Navy International
. December 1990, 441
89See Schneider, 746. Rumors have been floating around that
Brazil may be interested in these craft, although it is somewhat
doubtful given their reportedly poor condition. See Navy
International . September 1988, 413.
90Adrian J. English, "Latin American Navies In Recession,"
Naval Forces . Vol. 11 No. 2 1990 [hereinafter "English ( 90 )"] , 105.
91See Tim Golden, "Argentine Leader Sees Gulf Role As Best Way
to Reverse Old Image," The New York Times . 01 October 1990, A12;
and Robert L. Scheina, "Latin American Navies," United States Naval
Institute Proceedings
. March 1991 [hereinafter "Scheina ( 91 )"] , 89.
92Scheina(91 ) , 89
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boats are being modified to accept a nuclear propulsion
plant. 93
With its aircraft carrier incapacitated for an
indeterminate period, and due to austere funding,
Argentina's navy has degraded from a blue water navy in 1980
to a brown water navy at best in 1990. Of major
significance is its total lack of tankers. The amphibious
force has shrunk down to a single LST. Through substantial
decommissionings , Argentina has reduced the average age of
its fleet. Currently, 78 percent of the fleet was
commissioned after the 1960s. Germany has become its
biggest supplier of naval vessels, accounting for 42 percent
of the 1990 fleet. Table III.A-4 summarizes the Argentine











ACTIVE NAVAL FLEET: 33


















PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS: 13 (3911
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Fast Attack Craft (Gun)

















SHIP SOURCES BY COUNTRY 15 COMMISSIONING DATE
Germany 42% 1990
Argentina 15% 1980


















aHas not been fully operational since 1985
bIncludes both f and fc
Key-. d-domestic construction
f-foreign construction
fc-domestic construction under foreign contract
Source: adapted from Richard Sharpe (ed.) Jane '
s




ARGENTINE NAVY, 1980-1990: A COMPARISON
NAVAL FORCE PERSONNEL 1980: 30,930; 1990: 22,000
TRANS-
VESSEL TYPE 1980 FERS DECOM a 1990
Submarines 4 2 2 4
Aircraft Carrier 1 1
Cruiser 1 1
Destroyers 9 4 7 6
Frigates 2 5 7
Patrol Ships 8 1 2 7
Fast Attack (Gun) 2 2
Fast Attack (Torp) 2 2
Coastal Patrol 4 4
Large Patrol Craft 3 3
Landing Ship (Tank) 4 3 1
Landing Ship (Dock) 1 1
Tankers 3 3
Icebreakers 2 1 1
TOTALS 46 12 25 33
SHIP SOURCE BY COUNTRY (percent)
1980 1990
United States 52 Germany 42
Argentina 13 Argentina 15
Germany 11 United States 15
Israel 9 Israel 12
Britain 7 Britain 9
France 4 France 9
Finland 2
Spain 2
aincludes vessels destroyed during Malvinas war
Source: adapted from John Moore (Ed) Jane's Fighting
Ships. 1980-1981 (London: Jane's, 1980), 23-33; and
Richard Sharpe (Ed) Jane's Fighting Ships. 1990-1991
(Surrey: Jane's, 1990), 9-16.
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6. Shipbuilding and Planned Acquisitions
Argentina would like to sell some of its indigenously
built MEKO Type 140 frigates or TR 1700 submarines to help
establish its shipbuilding industry. Currently, there are
no ongoing shipbuilding programs in progress other than
those under foreign contract discussed previously. 94
7. Needs of the Argentine Navy
As previously established, Argentine geopolitical
doctrine requires a viable blue water navy. The purpose of
this section is to subjectively evaluate the various types
of ships needed by the navy without regard to cost (See
Table III.A-6). Levels of need are differentiated by
assigning numerical values to ship types. Types that are
most needed are assigned a plus two; those vessels that are
the least needed at the current time, are assigned minus
two; for degrees of need that fall in between the values of
plus one, zero, and minus one are assigned. These values,
called the Geopolitical Need ( GN ) , are used at the end of
Part One to help determine which U.S. ships, that are to be
decommissioned, may be desired by Argentina.
94Argentina has stated it is interested in purchasing U.S.
built SH-2G Sea Sprite helicopters for its MEKO 360 class frigates,
a purchase that would require Congressional approval. Also, the






















As Table III.A-6 indicates, Argentina needs a new
aircraft carrier (even if Veinticinco de Mayo finishes
modernization, which is doubtful at this point, the ship may
not make it into the next decade because of its age). Since
losing its one cruiser in the Malvinas, Argentina has needed
a replacement. Finally, the navy's almost complete lack of




1. Brazilian Navy, 1980
Brazil's navy of 1980 was similar in composition to
Argentina's at the time. It, too, had an aging aircraft
carrier, although it lacked a cruiser. Its navy was largely
comprised of second-hand U.S. navy vessels; 47 percent of
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the fleet was U.S. built. 95 An indicator of the fleet's age
is that the commissioning dates of 61 percent of the fleet
was before 1960. Brazil's amphibious and tanker support was
more modest than Argentina's in 1980. In sum, Brazil's navy
in 1980 can be categorized as a very weak blue water navy. 96
Table III.B-1 summarizes the 1980 Brazilian navy.
95In the early 1960s, Brazil found it difficult to acquire
modern armaments from the United States. This led to Brazil's move
away from military dependence on the U.S. and towards producing its
own indigenous arms industry. See Ferreira, 24.
960ne naval leader acknowledged after the Malvinas war that
Brazil's navy was unprepared to fight a similar war. "If the
Brazilian navy got involved in war like that of the Malvinas, it





































































fc-domestic construction under foreign contract
afigure includes 12,000 marines and auxiliary corps
bincludes both f and fc
Source: adapted from John Moore (ed.) Jane ' s Fighting
Ships. 1980-1981 (London: Jane's, 1980), 56-65.
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2. Ship Acquisitions, 1980-1990
A total of seven vessels were delivered to Brazil
during the 1980s. All but one were from the United States.
There are currently three units under contract for domestic
construction.
One German built 209 Class (Type 1400) SS was
delivered in 1988. Brazilian shipbuilders have three more
on contract. A German design was selected after intense
competition from the British, French, and Italians. The
Type 1400, approximately $200 million apiece, is a very
capable SS and compares well to the Argentine TR 1700. It
can dive down to 820 feet, has a submerged speed of close to
22 knots and an extended range of 12,000 nm. 97
Four ex-U.S. Garcia-class frigates were leased for
five years beginning in 1989 and 1990. 98 These are 1960s
vintage ASW platforms that carry ASROC ( Anti-Submarine
Rocket), two five-inch guns, and a moderately capable bow-
mounted sonar. 99 These ships have helicopter accommodations
for the SH-2.
97For more details, see Eduardo I. Pesce, "Brazil's Silent
Service," United States Naval Institute Proceedings . March 1989
[hereinafter "Pesce ( 89 )"] , 64.
98Ex-USS Bradley (FF-1041), ex-USS Davidson (FF-1045),
ex-USS Sample (FF-1048), and ex-USS Albert David (FF-1050).
"It is not clear if the SQR-15 TACTAS (Tactical Towed Array
Sonar) was transferred along with the ex- Sample and ex-Albert David




Brazil acquired two ex-U.S. Thomaston -class LSDs in
1989 and late 1990. 100 These "dock landing ships" were
commissioned in the mid-1950s as a result of renewed U.S.
interest in amphibious operations following the Korean war.
The only firepower they have are six-three inch anti-
aircraft (AA) batteries. Table III.B-2 summarizes Brazilian
ship acquisitions in the 1980s.
100Ex-USS Hermitage (LSD-34) and ex-USS Alamo (LSD-34)
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TABLE III.B-2
BRAZILIAN SHIP ACQUISITIONS, 1980-1990
SUBMARINES
209 Class (Type 1400) ( Diesel ) --GERMANY
(1) German built-delivered 1988
(3) Under contract for domestic construction
FRIGATES
Ex-US "Garcia" Class (Steam turbine ) --UNITED STATES
(4) United States built-delivered 1989-90
(5 yr lease)
LANDING SHIPS (DOCK)
Ex-US "Thomaston" Class (Steam Turbine ) --UNITED
STATES





3 Vessels under contract
Germany 3 a
ato be built in Brazil
Source: adapted from Richard Sharpe (ed.) Jane '
s
Fighting Ships. 1990-1991 (Surrey: Jane's, 1990), 51-
64.
3. Brazilian Shipbuilding, 1980-1990
Paradoxically, Brazil, a country with significant
merchant shipbuilding facilities and a rather large arms
export industry, has done relatively poorly in developing
its indigenous naval ship building capability. Brazil has
not taken advantage of the fact that it owns one of the
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largest shipbuilding industry in the world. 101 One of the
problems has been the difficulty in convincing private
shipyards to interrupt successful merchant ship programs and
rearrange its assembly line to satisfy small and sporadic
navy orders. 102 One observer describes the dilemma:
With all the obstacles to producing domestically its
materiel, the Brazilian Navy now is heavily dependent on
foreign suppliers in spite of the country's large
shipbuilding capabilities. Undoubtedly, this dependence
is the greatest impediment for the accomplishment of
strategies devised to fulfill independent national
political objectives. 103
There was an initiative in the late 1970s to boost
domestic naval shipbuilding industries. It demanded that at
least 60 percent of construction costs for Brazilian naval
programs be spent in Brazil. 104 In effect, this move
prompted the navy to seek foreign contract construction
programs in order to avoid these types of restrictions on
domestically-built ships.
A total of six naval ships were built domestically




104See Frans de Blocq van Kuffeler, "Latin America: A
Patchwork of Strengths and Capabilities," in John Moore (ed.)
Jane's Naval Review . (London: Jane's, 1982), 27. In 1987, a new
emphasis was placed on privatizing national shipyards prompting the
naval shipyard at Rio de Janeiro to acquire the capability to build
submarines and various specialized vessels. See Martin Cohen,




Tracker-class coastal patrol craft were delivered by
Astreleiros shipyard, Porto Alegre, by 1989. Initial plans
were to construct these lightly armed EEZ patrol vessels at
the rate of two per year, but this pace has slowed due to
budgetary constraints.
Two tankers were delivered, one 10,000 ton in 1990
and one 1300 ton. The large Almirante Gastao Motta is to
replace the aging Maraj6 . and is fitted for both abeam and
astern refueling. 105 Table III.B-3 summarizes Brazilian
domestic naval shipbuilding during the 1980s.
TABLE III.B-3
BRAZILIAN NAVAL SHIPBUILDING, 1980-1990
COASTAL PATROL (4) "Tracker" Class (Diesel ) -1989
LARGE TANKER (1) Gas Turbine-1990
SMALL TANKER (1) Steam Turbine-1989
Note: table does not include (3) Type 209-class SS
being built under German contract.
Source: adapted from Richard Sharpe (ed.) Jane '
s
Fighting Ships. 1990-1991 (Surrey: Jane's, 1990), 51-
64.
4. Ships Decommissioned, 1980-1990
Like Argentina, Brazil mothballed a number of old
vessels purchased from the United States. Four Guppy-class
105For more details, see Eduardo I. Pesce, "Brazilian Navy
Update," United States Naval Institute Proceedings , March 1985
[hereinafter "Pesce ( 85 )"] , 186.
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diesel submarines, four Fletcher-class destroyers, and one
"511-1152" class LST were decommissioned. All these ships
were of 1940s vintage. Also, one Dutch-built coastal patrol
ship, built in the 1950s, was removed from active service.
Table III.B-4 provides a summary of Brazilian ships
decommission from 1980 to 1990.
TABLE III.B-4
BRAZILIAN SHIP DECOMMISSIONINGS , 1980-1990
VESSEL TYPE CLASS COMMISSIONED
SUBMARINES (1) Ex-US Guppy III Type 1946
(3) Ex-US Guppy II Type 1945-1946
DESTROYERS (4) Ex-US "Fletcher" 1944-1946
LST (1) Ex-US "511-1152" 1945
COASTAL (1) Dutch built "Imperial
PATROL SHIP Marinheiro" 1955
Source: adapted from Richard Sharpe (ed.) Jane '
s
Fighting Ships. 1990-1991 (Surrey: Jane's, 1990), 51-
64.
5. Brazilian Navy, 1990
The navy's main mission responsibility is to guard
its 5,000 mile coastline and 200 nm EEZ, with secondary
primary missions of keeping both the Atlantic Narrows and
the Amazon waterway system open. 106 The Brazilian
106See Ludwig, 61.
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constitution of 1980 prohibits its armed forces from
conducting offensive operations. 107
The last twenty years has seen a steady decrease in
Brazilian defense spending, falling from 5.0 to 0.8 percent
of GNP. The 1990 defense budget shrank to an incredibly low
0.2 percent of GNP. 108 In another comparison, Brazil's
defense budget has shriveled from 23 percent of the national
budget in 1971 to 3.7 percent today. 109 To supplement the
Navy's budget, 20 percent of the annual offshore oil
royalties, worth about $35 million a year, are diverted to
the navy. 110 Three main programs have been identified as
priority budget items: modernization of the Niteroi , the
purchase of new helicopters, and the development of a
SSN. 11X
The Brazilian aircraft carrier, Minas Gerais , was
modernized in 1984 but is still not capable of supporting
modern jet aircraft. In Brazil, the air force owns and
107Luria, 933.
108Scheina(90) . 112.
109Latin American Weekly Report . 12 September 1991, 3.
110See Pesce(87) , 134.
111Joris J. Lok, "Field Narrows in Niteroi Contest," Jane '
s
Defence Weekly , 10 August 1991, 223; and "Brazil to Acquire Lynx
Helicopters," Jane's Defence Weekly
.
14 September 1991, 455.
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operates all fixed-wing aircraft. 112 Hence, Brazilian
battlegroups carry little or no indigenous air defense
capability. The navy must rely upon the air force to
provide cover only as far as 350 kilometers offshore. 113
The last Niter6i class frigate was delivered from the
Rio de Janeiro shipyard in 1980. These craft carry Exocets,
Seacat surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), two 4.5 inch guns,
torpedoes, and a medium frequency hull-mounted sonar. 114
Priority has been placed on modernizing six of these ships,
including enhanced AAW capability. Plans are to replace the
Seacat with either the Vertical-Launch Seawolf (UK), the
Alenia Aspide (Italy), or the Matra Mistral (Italy). The
introduction of any of these three SAM systems would be a
first for the region. This program will consume $200-250
million and it is likely that the final number of ships
modernized could be as few as two or three. 115 Together
112The navy operates helicopters only as a result of a 1965
presidential decision. The air force adamantly refuses to allow
the other services to operate fixed-wing aircraft, making it
unlikely the navy will recover its fixed-wing capability in the
near future. See Pesce(87), 136.
113See Luria, 936.
114For a detailed discussion of this class, see Eduardo I.
Pesce, "The Brazilian Mk-10 Frigates," United States Naval
Institute Proceedings . March 1981, 127-129. In 1989, the navy
announced its intent to purchase eight General Dynamics-
manufactured Phalanx Mk-15 Mod-II close-in weapon systems (CIWS)
for the Niter6i -class frigates at a cost of $63 million. See
Scheina(89 ) , 128.
115Lok, "Field Narrows in Niteroi Contest," 223.
61
with the recently leased ex-U.S. Garcia-class frigates,
these ships give Brazil a solid ASW foundation. However,
these units are little match against modern nuclear-powered
submarines. Also, Brazil's eastern seaboard is too shallow
to deploy an effective Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS)
type barrier. 116
Brazil's sizeable, well-trained Marine Corps lacks
amphibious potential due to the navy's shortage of sea lift
and assault craft. Its ability to launch amphibious
operations, for example, on the West African coast, would be
hindered by the lack of sea lift and also the navy's limited
cross-oceanic reach. 117 The addition of the two ex-U.S.
Thomaston LSDs is a step towards rectifying this situation.
In 1990, the United States was still the supplier for
the majority of the Brazilian fleet. That fleet remained an
old one, with 43 percent of its ships commissioned before
1960. The navy of 1990 qualifies as a strong brown water
navy. It is not a blue water navy because of its limited
ability to project power on the high seas for extended
periods. Table III.B-5 summarizes the Brazilian navy in












ACTIVE NAVAL FLEET 56
PRINCIPAL COMBATANTS: 24 (43%)
Submarines 5 (5f)
Aircraft carrier 1 (If)
Destroyers 8 (8f)
Frigates 10 (8f, 2fc)














































fc-domestic construction under foreign contract
afigure includes 14,600 marines and auxiliary corps
bincludes both f and fc
Source: adapted from John Moore (ed.) Jane ' s Fighting
Ships. 1980-1981
. (London: Jane's, 1980), 56-65; and
Richard Sharpe (ed.) Jane's Fighting Ships. 1990-1991
(Surrey: Jane's, 1990), 51-64.
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TABLE III.B-6
BRAZILIAN NAVY, 1980-1990 A COMPARISON
BRAZILIAN NAVY: 1980 -1990
NAVAL FORCE PERSONNEL 1980: 45,500; 1990: 50,000
TRANS- HOME-
VESSEL TYPE 1980 FERS BUILT DECOM 1990
Submarines 8 1 4 5
Aircraft Carrier 1 1
Destroyers 12 4 8
Frigates 6 4 10
Coastal Patrol 10 1 9
River Monitor 1 1
River Patrol Ships 5 5
Large Patrol Craft 6 6
Coastal Patrol 4 4
Landing Ships-Tank 2 1 1
Landing Ships-Dock 2 2
Large Tanker 1 1 2
Small Tanker 1 1 2
TOTALS 53 10 57












Source: Adapted from John Moore (Ed) Jane's Fighting
Ships. 1980-1981 (London: Jane's, 1980), 56-65; and
Richard Sharpe (Ed) Jane's Fighting Ships. 1990-1991
(Surrey: Jane's, 1990), 51-64.
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6. Shipbuilding Programs and Planned Acquisitions
Three additional 209 class (Type 1400) diesel boats
should reach the fleet during the early 1990s. The program




Despite budgetary difficulties, Brazil still
maintains plans to develop a nuclear submarine by 2010. 119
Projected parameters include a 2,700 ton displacement, 25-30
knots submerged, and a 50-megawatt reactor. Brazil already
has an operational uranium production plant west of Sao
Paulo. 120 Neither Brazil nor Argentina have signed the
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.
The navy had planned to build a total of sixteen of
the indigenously-designed (with German advice) Inhauma-class
frigates. Two units were delivered in 1991, and only two
more are scheduled for delivery. 121 These are designed to
replace the ex-U.S. Gearing -class destroyers that remain in
the inventory. These $150 million frigates displace 1,600-
tons, employ gas turbine propulsion, carry Exocet, one 4.5
inch gun and torpedoes, and have a medium frequency hull-
mounted sonar. Their projected mission will be to defend
118See Luria, 936.
119Dean Martins, "Running the SSN Race," Jane's Defence Weekly ,




both remote and coastal areas as well as to escort coastal
and ocean-going convoys. 122 These ships were designed by
the Brazilian Naval Design Office with advice from German
private assistance. 123
Most recently, Brazil has expressed an interest in
United States destroyers, specifically Charles F. Adams -
class DDGs. 124 Also, the navy is looking to procure an
icebreaker to support Antarctic scientific missions 125
8. Needs of the Brazilian Navy
Like Argentina, Brazil needs a new aircraft carrier
to replace the forty-five year old Minas Gerais . The navy
also requires a cruiser, a platform they currently do not
have. With a 5000 nm coastline, more diesel submarines
could be used. Additionally, the amphibious navy could use
more ships. Table III.B-7 subjectively ranks ship types
needed by the navy, without regard to cost. As before,
levels of need are differentiated by assigning numerical
values to ship types. Types that are most needed are
assigned a plus two; those vessels that are the least needed
122See Luria, 936.
123For more background information, see Eduardo I. Pesce, "The
Brazilian Modernization Program," United States Naval Institute





SHIP TYPES NEEDED BY BRAZIL TO ACHIEVE A BLUE-WATER NAVY
GEOPOLITICAL NEED (GN)















at the current time, are assigned minus two; for degrees of
need that fall in between the values of plus one, zero, and
minus one are assigned.
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C. CHILE
1. Chilean Navy, 1980
Chile's naval fleet in 1980 was predominantly 1940s-
vintage, secondhand U.S. navy ships. The fleet's biggest
drawback was that it lacked an aircraft carrier. Most of
its principal combatants were obsolete. It had a few
tankers, but did not have any icebreakers. Only six percent
of the navy's ships had been designed and built
indigenously. In short, Chile had a brown water navy in




NAVAL FORCE PERSONNEL; 25.920
Officers: 1,985
Ratings: 23,935
ACTIVE NAVAL FLEET: 32









PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS: 10 (31%)
Patrol Ships
Fast Attack Craft (Missile







































fc-domestic construction under foreign contract
aincludes f and fc
Source: adapted from John Moore (ed. ) , Jane ' s Fighting
Ships, 1980-1981 (London: Jane's, 1980), 90-97.
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2. Chilean Ship Acquisitions, 1980-1990
Chile purchased two German-built 209 class (Type
1300) diesel submarines in the early part of the decade.
Two more units were projected in the 1988 five year plan,
but the navy may opt for a different type, perhaps the
British Oberon -class
.
Four ex-British County-class destroyers were
delivered between 1984 and 1987. These ships underwent
extensive refit by Chilean shipyards prior to commissioning
into the Chilean navy. Seaslug launchers were removed in
order to extend the helicopter deck so that these vessels
can now accommodate AS-332 Super Puma helicopters. 126 At
least one unit may have been fitted with a towed array
sonar. 127 All units are armed with Exocets, two 4.5 inch
guns, torpedoes, and a short-range, high-frequency, hull-
mounted sonar. The fourth unit was delivered at a cost of
$14 million. 128
The Chileans purchased a 1959 survey ship from the
Dutch that is used as an Antarctic patrol ship. Its hull
was reinforced so that it could navigate in ice, but it does
not qualify as an icebreaker.
126The navy purchased four French Super Puma and four Dauphin
helicopters in 1990 for these ships. See Scheina(91), 93.
127See Jane's Defence Weekly . 22 October 1988, 1007.
128Scheina(88) . 29.
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Israel sold a total of four SAAR-class patrol boats
to Chile in the early 1980s. Two of the units are SAAR 4
missile attack craft, which are diesel-propelled and armed
with Gabriel SSM and two three-inch Italian-made 0T0 Melara
guns. These craft are deployed in the Beagle channel. The
other two are SAAR 3 missile attack craft which are smaller
than the SAAR 4-class and carry only one three-inch gun.
While a part of the Israeli Navy, these units deployed U.S.-
made HARPOON missiles. The missiles were removed prior to
delivery to Chile because of the 1976 U.S. arms embargo
against the government of General Pinochet.
Lastly, one British-made tanker was delivered in 1982
after it served in the Malvinas war. Table III.C-2
summarizes Chilean ship acquisitions in the 1980s.
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TABLE III.C-2
CHILEAN SHIP ACQUISITIONS, 1980-1990
SUBMARINES
209 Class (Type 1300) ( Diesel ) --GERMANY
(2) German built-delivered in 1984
DESTROYERS
Ex-British "County" Class--BRITAIN





SAAR 4 Class ( Diesel ) --ISRAEL
(2) Israeli built-delivered in 1980-1981
SAAR 3 Class (Diesel ) --ISRAEL
(2) Israeli built-delivered in 1988
TANKER
(Steam turbine ) -BRITAIN
(1) British built-delivered in 1982
SUMMARY





Source: adapted from Richard Sharpe (ed.) Jane '
s
Fighting Ships. 1990-1991 (Surrey: Jane's, 1990), 95-
105.
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3. Ships Decommissioned, 1980-1990
Eleven vessels were decommissioned during the decade,
with all but one of U.S. construction and pre-1950s vintage.
One Brooklyn -class cruiser was mothballed leaving one, the
' Hiqqins . sister ship to Argentina's General Belqrano . in
the fleet. Table III.C-3 summarizes the decommissionings
.
TABLE III.C-3
CHILEAN SHIP DECOMMISSIONINGS, 1980-1990
VESSEL-TYPE CLASS COMMISSIONED
SUBMARINES (1) Ex-US "Balao" 1944
CRUISERS (1) Ex-Swedish "Gota Lejon" 1947
(1) Ex-US "Brooklyn" 1938
DESTROYERS (2) Ex-US "Fletcher" 1943-4
FRIGATES (3) Ex-US "Charles Lawrence" 1943-5
PATROL SHIP (1) Ex-US "Sotoyomo" 1944
LARGE PATROL
CRAFT (2) Chilean-built 1966-7
Source: adapted from John Moore (Ed) Jane ' s Fighting
Ships. 1980-1981 (London: Jane's, 1980), 90-97; and
Richard Sharpe (Ed) Jane's Fighting Ships. 1990-1991
(Surrey: Jane's, 1990), 95-105.
4. Chilean Navy, 1990
Chile has turned its fleet into a superb Latin
American navy. What it lacks in quantity it makes up for
with well-trained personnel and professional pride. By
1990, the navy was predominately British-made and relatively
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new, with 72 percent of the units commissioned in the 1960s
and later. Its fifteen principal combatants makes it a
borderline brown water navy by definition, but it performs
its mission well. Featuring four tankers, the fleet has the
potential to operate at sea for extended periods. Its
weakest point is the absence of an aircraft carrier and the
presence of only one, aging cruiser. 129 Chile's Navy is
short in ASW capability with only two frigates. In sum, the
navy is small, but effective as a brown water force.
The Chilean defense budget is set by law above a
specified minimum floor level. Before Pinochet left office,
he passed this legislation and also passed laws guaranteeing
significant autonomy to the services over their budgets. 130
The Leander-class unit Lynch was refitted to
accommodate updated Exocet versions, with range extended
from 42 to 70 km. 131 The navy plans to fit its surface
fleet with the Israeli Barak 1, a 10 km range point defense
vertical launch missile system, over an eight year
period. 132
129There had been some discussion in the mid-1980s of possibly
converting 'Higgins into a helicopter carrier and then purchasing
the former British carrier Hermes . but financial constraint
prevented it. See Robert L. Scheina, "The Chilean Navy," United
States Naval Institute Proceedings . March 1988, 33.
130See Raul Sohr, "Chile's Defenses Open Up," Defense & Foreign
Affairs , May-June 1990, 38.
131Scheina(91) , 90.
132See Jane's Defence Weekly , 24 June 1989, 1296.
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The Chilean navy, in keeping with its country's South
Pacific interests, has quietly established ties to the New
Zealand navy. Ships from the New Zealand navy have long




Also since 1980, the Chilean navy has built up its
infrastructure and basing in Tierra del Fuego and in the
Beagle Channel region. Chile also has nine (non-military)
stations on the Palmer Peninsula of Antarctica. 134 Table
III.C-4 summarizes the Chilean navy of 1990 and Table III.C-
5 compares the fleets of 1980 and 1990.
133See Adrian J. English, "Defense in Chile,"






NAVAL FORCE PERSONNEL: 24.700
Officers 2,000
Ratings 22,700
ACTIVE NAVAL FLEET: 34









PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS: 12 (35%
Patrol Ships
Fast Patrol Craft (Missile)











SHIP SOURCE BY COUNTRY 3
Britain 32% 1990
Germany 18% 1980s
















fc-domestic construction under foreign contract
aincludes both f and fc
Source: adapted from Richard Sharpe (ed.). Jane '
s




CHILEAN NAVY. 1980-1990 A COMPARISON
NAVAL FORCE PERSONNEL 1980: 25 .920; 1990: 24,700
TRANS-
VESSEL TYPE 1980 FERS DECOM 1990
Submarines 3 2 1 4
Cruisers 3 2 1
Destroyers 6 4 2 8
Frigates 5 3 2
Patrol Ships 3 1 1 3
Attack (Missile ) 4 4
Attack (Torpedo ) 4 4
Large Patrol Craft 3 2 1
Landing Ships-T ank 3 3
Tankers 2 2 a 4
TOTALS 32 13 a 11 34
SHIP SOURCE BY COUNTRY (percent)
1980 1990
United States 56 Britain 32
Britain 19 Germany 18
Germany 13 United States 18
Chile 6 Israel 12







aincludes one intra-country transfer of a former
commercial tanker
Source: adapted from John Moore (ed.) Jane ' s Fighting
Ships. 1980-1981 (London: Jane's. 1980), 90-97; and
Richard Sharpe (ed.) Jane's Fighting Ships. 1990-1991
(Surrey: Jane's, 1990), 95-105.
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5. Shipbuilding and Planned Acquisitions
Chile plans to purchase three or four Moray-class
diesel submarines from the Netherlands, and would like to
build some of them domestically. Plans are to build the
submarine force to eight strong to match Peru's force of six
Type 209s and five older boats. Chile would also like to
purchase additional Leander-class frigates from Britain to




Other plans may include the purchase of two more Type
209 boats and four additional SAAR 4 missile boats by
1994. 136 Also under consideration is the purchase of a
Vertical/Short Take-off and Landing (VSTOL) carrier. 137
The Chilean arms producer, Cardoeir, has purchased
the Italian midget submarine manufacturer, Cosmos of
Livorno. 138 Midget submarines could possibly be built
mainly for export, because Chile requires larger, deep-sea
capable boats to protect its long shoreline.
135See Joris J. Lok, "Moray, Leander Buys Considered," Jane '
s
Defence Weekly , 06 October 1990, 622.
136See Navy International . December 1990, 441.
137Scheina(90) , 113.
138See Scheina(91) , 93.
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6. Needs of the Chilean Navy
Based on the preceding analysis, Table III.C-6
subjectively ranks the degree of need the Chilean navy has
for various ship types.
TABLE III.C-6























D. CONCLUSION TO CHAPTER III
This chapter has presented the naval ship trends of the
Southern Cone navies. It started with the 1980 navies, then
addressed ship acquisitions through transfers and domestic
shipbuilding programs, losses due to decommissioning and
arrived at the navies of 1990. It compared the navies of
1980 and 1990 and then examined planned acquisitions and
domestic shipbuilding for the near future. In summary, it
was found that none of the three navies attained a blue-
water status despite the blue-water requirements of each
country's geopolitics. The types of ships that are needed
79
by each navy was derived from this analysis by taking into
consideration only the difference between the type of navy
required by geopolitical doctrine and the type of navy
currently deployed. The numerical values, or geopolitical
need, assigned to individual rankings are used at the end of
Part One to help determine the types of decommissioned U.S.
ships that are most likely to be desired by each navy.
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IV. WHY SOUTHERN CONE NAVIES
ARE INCONSISTENT WITHGEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS
This chapter briefly examines the main reasons why
Southern Cone navies are not consistent with their
geopolitical and strategic maritime interests.
A. ECONOMICS
The Southern Cone nations face enormous economic and
financial constraints. They are heavily indebted to foreign
creditors. 139 Throughout the 1980s, Argentina and Brazil
suffered from rampant inflation and little or negative
economic growth, although there are recent signs that the
worst is past. 140 Today, Brazil's military officer corps
typically has to work an additional job to make ends
meet. 141 As recently as 1985, the Brazilian Naval Minister
139Southern Cone foreign debt at the end of 1990: Argentina,
$60.5 billion; Brazil, $121.0 billion; and Chile, $16.8 billion.
Latin American Weekly Report , 29 August 1991, 6.
140The 1990 accumulated total inflation rate for Brazil was
1,287.0%; for Argentina, 2,314.0%; and Chile, 26.1%. InterAmerican
Development Bank, quoted in Nathaniel C. Nash, "A New Discipline
in Economics Brings Change to Latin America," The New York Times .
13 November 1991, Al. See also William R. Long, "Brazil, Argentina
Grapple With Inflation," The Los Angeles Times , 02 February 1991,
Dl. Also, see Julia Michaels, "Brazil, Argentina Fight Inflation,"
The Christian Science Monitor , 06 February 1991, 7.
141A Brazilian army general makes about one-third the salary
of a Brazilian Congressman. See James Brooke, "'Free Falling
Salaries Anger Brazil's Military," The New York Times , 06 December
1990, A4.
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described a plan to increase fleet size by 100 percent by
the year 2005. 142 Naval budgets since then have allowed
very few fleet additions. Chile, atypical in Latin America,
has a relatively healthy economy. General Pinochet and his
successor, President Patricio Aylwin, have successfully
steered Chile away from the serious economic pitfalls
experienced by other nations in the region. 143
Military expenditures have remained steady or decreased
during the 1980s. 144 Table IV.A-1 shows military
expenditures for each country in constant (1988) price
figures
.
Table IV.A-1 shows that Chile's military expenditures
rose slightly at the beginning of the decade, then leveled
out while Argentina and Brazil's declined. Another key
point is that, although Chile's economy may be healthier
than Argentina and Brazil's, it is a much smaller economy.
142Almirate-de-Esquadra Alfredo Karam quoted in Jane ' s Defence
Weekly
. 29 June 1985, 1277.
143See Mark Svolos, "Chile Stays On Track," The Times of the
Americas , 28 November 1990, 13.
144Seven factors influence defense spending: economic
conditions in the country, the role of the armed services in
nonmilitary affairs, internal security needs, reactions to arms
purchase by neighbors, budget allocations of service branches in
rival sates, internal political support, and the age and condition
of existing military equipment. See Peter C. Frederiksen and
Robert E. Looney, "Arms Races In the Third World: Argentina and
Brazil," Armed Forces & Society , Winter 1989, 265. For a general
discussion on the relationship between the arms trade and economic
crisis, see Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, Arms Transfers to





SOUTHERN CONE MILITARY EXPENDITURES, 1980-1989








1981 5,711 3,362 1,394
1982 4,927 4,532 1,574
1983 3,897 3,276 1,313
1984 4,056 3,703 1,597
1985 3,087 3,857 1.307
1986 3,194 4,428 1.451
1987 2,966 3,908 1,299
1988 3,225 3,899 1,572
1989 3,000 3,691 1,568
Source
:
SIPRI Yearbook (New York: Oxford Un
1990), 195
This explains why, even though it has enjoyed economic
success, it cannot afford to purchase expensive naval
platforms like aircraft carriers and cruisers.
Table IV.A-2 shows military expenditure as a percentage
of gross domestic product (GDP). These figures illustrate
that ABC military spending was steady (Brazil and Chile) or
declined (Argentina) during the 1980s. 145
In sum, the economies of the Southern Cone have not
supported building the blue water navies demanded by their
geopolitics
.
145There has been debate among economists as to whether
military spending may actually be growth-inducing. Arms transfer
economist Saadet Deger concludes that "the effects of an increased
military burden are growth- depressing " with respect to savings,
investment, and human capital. See Deger, Military Expenditure in
Third World Countries: The Economic Effects (London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1986), 245 (emphasis added).
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TABLE IV.A-2







1981 7. 1 1. 3 7.4
1982 6.0 1.6 9.5
1983 4. 6 1. 2 8.0
1984 4. 5 1.2 9.6
1985 3. 5 1. 1 7.6
1986 3.7 1.2 8.0
1987 3.4 1. 1 6.8
1988 3.0 1. 1 7.8
Source: Saadet Deger and Somnath Sen, Military
Expenditure: The Political Economy of International
Security (Oxford: Oxford University, 1990), 170.
B. WORLD POLITICS
International actors have imposed numerous obstacles for
developing the ABC navies. Chile faced an arms embargo by
the United States and Britain from 1976 until 1990. This
forced Chile to become less dependent on these countries for
naval warships, but reduced the number of suppliers of
quality second-hand units. President Bush lifted the
embargo in December 1990, and this may allow for future
U . S . -to-Chile ship transfers.
Another factor contributing to the inability of ABC
navies to achieve blue-water status has been the hesitancy
of free world military powers, especially the United States,
to transfer advanced naval technology to Third World states.
The United States seems only willing to sell platforms that
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are obsolete. Argentina has continued to be hurt by
Britain's logistics embargo since the 1982 Malvinas war.
Until recently, this made it nearly impossible for Argentina
to acquire spare parts for its British-made naval equipment.
In other words, the ABC countries have not been able to rely
on foreign suppliers to make available technologically-




The changing international system also affects the
Southern Cone navies. The U . S . -supported ABC navies were
largely oriented towards fulfilling a cold war role of
protecting coastal SLOCs in the South Atlantic. It seems
apparent that part of the reason that blue water navies were
not aggressively pursued was because it was felt the United
States would protect blue water SLOCS and hence their
biggest worry was a Soviet presence inside their EEZ. As
discussed previously, a major motivating factor for the ABC
countries has been to protect their territorial and economic
zone waters from eastern bloc civilian trawlers and
potentially the Soviet Navy in a wartime scenario.
With the fall of the Soviet empire and with it a
diminished Soviet maritime threat, the Southern Cone now
lacks a extra-regional threat on which navies can base
defense spending. Although their geopolitical interests
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mandate blue-water capabilities, there currently is a lack
of a major threat to their blue-water interests. For
differing reasons, Southern Cone navies have not been able
to justify extra-hemispheric-based blue-water force plans
either during or after the Cold War.
D. NATIONAL STRATEGIES NOT CONSISTENT WITH
STATED GEOPOLITICAL THEMES
Despite the proliferation of geopolitical thinking in the
Southern Cone, it is likely that the elites of these
countries have been more concerned with internal, as opposed
to external threats. Each of the ABC countries has a
history of internal subversion, and political leaders are
aware that this type of threat is every bit as dangerous as
an external military threat. During the last several
decades, the perception of the communist menace and internal
subversion had caused each of the ABC countries to resort to
military rule and harsh domestic human rights violations.
In other words, historically, the internal threat has been
more imminent than the external threat. In the case of
Brazil, a Brazilian naval officer goes as far as to claim
that
the Navy's capacity to project power was actually
developed to counter an internal enemy, on both the
country's sea coast and in the large river basins. This
dovetails with the military policies which were developed
in previous decades and encouraged and supported by the
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United States. Priority was given in armed forces to
assure internal security against Communist guerrillas. 146
Unless there is a major regional conflict in the near
future, given the economic capacity of these countries, it
is hard to imagine a concerted push to develop working blue
water navies. It is not that these countries have
necessarily disregarded maritime geopolitical thinking in
general, but rather that they place a higher priority on
regional continental threats. This is evidenced by the
greater priority these countries generally place on their
armies and air forces than on their navies.
In sum, this chapter has outlined some of the reasons why
Southern Cone navies have not been developed to the degree
demanded by stated maritime interests. It has identified
the lack of an external maritime threat as the overriding
factor that has prevented these countries from pursuing and
attaining desired force levels. It also addressed the
possibility that, given their past preoccupation with
internal threats, they have not yet broken from historical
thought patterns that relegate naval matters to secondary
importance, behind continental security. Budgetary





V. RANKING U.S. WARSHIPS FOR
POTENTIAL TRANSFER TO
THE SOUTHERN CONE
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first
section looks at ships the United States plans to
decommission over the next several years. The second
section develops a weighted-factor analysis for each type of
ship to be decommissioned to arrive at a desirability-
ranking for each ABC country.
A. UNITED STATES NAVAL SHIP DECOMMISSIONINGS 147
The U.S. Navy plans to decommission 97 ships in fiscal
1992 and 1993. With Ticonderoqa -class Aegis cruisers and
Arleiqh Burke -class destroyers being added to the fleet, the
navy plans to decommission the entire Coontz - and Adams -
class guided missile destroyers. Budget considerations
prevent keeping the Iowa -class battleships on active duty,
despite the lengthy and costly modernization program each
had to go through before being brought back into the fleet
during the 1980s.
The number of carrier battlegroups is being reduced.
This has allowed three older aircraft carriers to be removed
from active duty.
147This section largely derived from David S. Steigman, "Ships,
Aircraft Get the Knife," Navy Times . 18 February 1991, 6.
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Most Knox -class frigates are scheduled to be transferred
to the Naval Reserve. At least six of these vessels have
been designated for transfer. 148 Greece has been designated
to receive three and Thailand has expressed an interest in
acquiring one or more. 149 A larger number of these ships
could be made available depending on foreign demand and
long-range NRF intentions. This paper assumes that there
will be several Knox -class available for possible future
transfer to the Southern Cone. 150
Table V.A-1 shows the classes and numbers of ships that
are scheduled for decommissioning during fiscal 1992.
B. RANKING U.S. SHIPS IN ORDER OF
PREFERENCE FOR EACH SOUTHERN CONE COUNTRY
This section is divided into two parts. The first part
briefly discusses factors that determine the type of ships
desired by the ABC countries (not including geopolitics).
The second part employs these factors in matrices to
determine rankings of U.S. ships. For purposes of this
paper, all but one of the factors are weighed equally. One
factor, economics, is weighed three times as heavily as the
148Interview with Mr. Bill Wither, Head OP-615, Washington,
D.C., 28 September 1991.
149See Robert Karniol, "Thai Navy Seeks Knox Frigates," Jane ' s
Defence Weekly . 19 October 1991, 705.
150For an overview of the world market and demand for older
naval vessels, see "The Second-Hand Warship Market," Navy







(23) Coontz and Adams early 1960s
(26) Knox a 1970s
(7) Iwo Jima 1960s
(2) Raleigh 1960s
TABLE V.A-1
UNITED STATES WARSHIP DECOMMISSIONINGS , FISCAL 1992









a40/46 total units designated for reserves
Source: adapted from David S. Steigman, "Ships,
Aircraft Get the Knife," Navy Times . 18 February
1991. 6.
others. Assigning subjective values from +2 to -2 for each
factor, and then applying a weighing factor of three to the
economics determinant, a ranking of ship types will result.
The final step is to add in the geopolitical factor
determined earlier, and with a weighing factor of two. The
final result will be a desirability ranking of ship type for
each Southern Cone country.
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1. Ranking Factors 151
a. Economic Cost
Both initial and long term costs are
considered. The initial cost is comprised of down payments
and purchase price. Long term costs include manning
requirements, fuel efficiency, and maintenance (a function
of platform age). An average of the long term costs is then
averaged with the initial cost to arrive at the overall
economic cost. In general, this factor will be the same for
each country.
b. Prestige
If technological level of transfer is above that
normally transferred by supplier, the recipient will receive
a degree of prestige. In the case of U.S. ship transfers,
the fact that some of these craft have relatively advanced
weapons systems may account for much prestige if sold to the
Southern Cone. In general, this factor will be the same for
each country.
c. Dependence on United States
This factor is broken down into supply-part
dependence and training dependence. In the case of some of
151Much of the background on this section is derived from
Christian Catrina, Arms Transfers and Dependence (New York: Taylor
& Francis, 1988) , 74-75.
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the older platforms, it is sometimes hard to obtain spares
in the United States because the original manufactures
sometimes go out of business. If transferred, this type of
problem becomes even harder to solve. Some (if not all) of
the manufactures of ship components may only operate in the
United States, implying the necessity of constructing a
logistical supply path between the United States-based
manufacturer and the recipient.
Training dependence is short-term in nature.
Once a nucleus of recipients is trained on the various
systems, they, in turn, can train the next generation. In
general, this factor will be the same for each country.
d. Implied Commitment to the United States
Latin American countries have long attempted to
break away from U.S. influence over their affairs. Entering
into an arms transfer deal with the U.S. may imply future
compliance with U.S. policy interests in the Latin American
region or in United Nations General Assembly votes. 152
Although Brazil, since the 1960s, has striven for military
and political independence from the U.S., it has recently
expressed an interest in obtaining U.S. ships. President
152The political, training, and logistics complications that
develop once an arms transfer agreement has been reached are
referred to as "back-end" problems. See Geoffrey Kemp, "Arms
Transfers and the 'Back-End' Problem in Developing Countries," in
Stephanie G. Neuman and Robert E. Harkavy (eds.) Arms Transfers in
the Modern World (New York: Praeger, 1979), 264-275.
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Menem of Argentina hopes to reinforce his personal political
power by joining the U.S. as a player in foreign affairs.
Chile has indicated it hopes to reestablish closer military
and economic ties as evidenced by recent free trade
negotiations and requests for military equipment. In short,
the ABC countries do not seem to be overly concerned with




Leverage is a function of supply and demand. If
the United States is actively searching for recipients to
purchase these decommissioned ships, then potential buyers
have a little extra leverage over the deal. If, however,
the Southern Cone countries want these ships more than the
U.S. needs to sell them, the leverage lies with the
supplier. In general, this factor will be the same for each
country.
f. Transfer of Technology
The U.S. ships that are scheduled for
decommissioning contain technologies not necessarily already
possessed by the ABC countries. These matrices assume that
all ship systems would be included as part of an arms deal.
In general, this factor will be the same for each country.
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g. Expansion of Trade
Ship sales to the Southern Cone could be a step
towards the establishment of a free trade area in the
region, as described in President Bush's Enterprise for the
Americas Initiative. In general, Chile is more willing and
able to join in on a hemispheric free trade pact than
Argentina or Brazil. Argentina and Brazil are concentrating
more on establishing a regional trading bloc amongst
themselves first (MERCOSUR). Ship leases would have a much
less significant impact on trade.
h. "Keeps Military Happy"
Southern Cone elites will keep this factor in
mind, considering the recent periods of military rule each
of these countries has experienced. Argentina, in December
1990, experienced a coup attempt. Every armed force wants a
defined mission and equipment to work with. Dissatisfied or
restless military commanders are less likely to stay in the
barracks
.
i. Impact on Recipient's Shipbuilding Industry
Purchase of foreign warships may stifle budding
domestic shipbuilding industries. In general, Brazil will
be hurt more by obtaining foreign ships because it has the
most significant domestic arms industry. The domestic
shipbuilders in Brazil have more to lose. Argentine and
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Chilean industry does not depend nearly as much on domestic
shipbuilding and would not be hurt to the same degree as
Brazil
.
j. Possibility that Transfer Could
Fuel a Regional Arms Race
A recent study concluded that military spending
in Argentina and Brazil was linked to the arms race between
them. 153 It is conceivable that should one ABC state
receive a number of U.S. warships, the other countries may
feel the necessity to make similar purchases. In general,
Argentina and Brazil will compete in an arms race, although
recent warming of relations indicate that this may be less
of a concern. Except for Antarctic concerns, Chile, being a
Pacific rather than an Atlantic power, does not care as much
what ships Brazil obtains. Due to Chile's mistrust of
Argentina, it may be concerned about Argentine acquisitions.
2. Ship Rankings
The next seven pages contain one table apiece (Table
V.B-1 to Table V.B-7) corresponding to each of the seven
ship types to be decommissioned by the United States Navy
(for purposes of this thesis, the auxiliary is assumed to be
a fleet replenishment oiler). Each matrix displays
recipient factors (RF) for which subjective numerical values
153Frederiksen and Looney, 269
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are assigned. The weighted sum of RFs determines Recipient
Need (RN). The RN weighed with the GN computed in chapter
three determines a ship's recipient desirability (RD).
Table V.B-8 ranks ship types for each country according to
its RD . The numerical values assigned are strictly
subjective, based on the author's own naval background, arms
transfers research, and knowledge of the ABC countries.
Other analysts may arrive at different values. Most
importantly, this method of analysis can be used by
decision-makers for ship transfers to any country.
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TABLE V.B-1
U.S. TO SOUTHERN CONE SHIP TRANSFER RECIPIENT FACTORS
AND RECIPIENT DESIRABILITY:











Average X 3 -6
PRESTIGE + 2


























4. COMMITMENT -1 -1
5. LEVERAGE -1 -1 -1
6. TECH TRANSFER + 2 + 2 + 2
7. EXPAND TRADE + 1 + 1 + 2
8. MILITARY HAPPY + 2 + 2 + 2
9. ARMS INDUSTRY -1
10 .ARMS RACE -1 -1 -1
RN -2. 5 -3. 5 -0. 5
GN + 2.0 + 2.0 + 2.0
RD + 1.5 +0.5 + 3.5
RF = recipient factor
RN - recipient need
GN geopolitical need (determined in chapter three)
RD = recipient desirability
= [ (RN) + (2 X GN)
]
key to recipient factors:
+2 = very positive aspect
+1 = positive aspect
neither positive nor negative aspect
-1 = negative aspect
















Average X 3 -6
PRESTIGE + 2
























Averaqe -1. 5 -1. 5 -1. 5
4. COMMITMENT -1 -1
5. LEVERAGE
6. TECH TRANSFER + 2 + 2 + 2
7. EXPAND TRADE + 1 + 1 + 2
8. KEEP NAVY HAPPY + 2 + 2 + 2
9. ARMS INDUSTRY -1
10 .ARMS RACE -1 -1 -1
RN -2. 5 -3. 5 -0. 5
GN + 2.0 + 2.0 + 2.0
RD + 1.5 + .0. 5 + 3.5
RF = recipient factor
RN - recipient need
GN = geopolitical need (determined in chapter three)
RD = recipient desirability
= [ (RN) + (2 X GN)
]
key to recipient factors:
+2 very positive aspect
+1 = positive aspect
= neither positive nor negative aspect
-1 negative aspect




U.S. TO SOUTHERN CONE SHIP TRANSFER RECIPIENT FACTORS
AND RECIPIENT DESIRABILITY:










2. PRESTIGE +2 + 2 + 2
3. DEPENDENCE ON US
Supply Parts -2 -2 -2
Training -1 -1 -1
RF ARGENTINA BRAZIL
ECONOMIC COST







Averaqe X 3 -6 -6
Averaqe -1.5 -1. 5 -1. 5
4. COMMITMENT -1 -1
5. LEVERAGE
6. TECH TRANSFER
7. EXPAND TRADE + 1 + 1 + 2
8. KEEP NAVY HAPPY + 1 + 1 + 1




RN: -4.5 -5.5 -2.5
GN +1.0 +1.0 +1.0
RD - -2.5 -3.5 -0.5
RF = recipient factor
RN = recipient need
GN = geopolitical factor (determined in chapter three)
RD = recipient desirability
= [ (RN) + (2 X GN)
]
key to recipient factors:
+2 = very positive aspect
+1 = positive aspect
= neither positive nor negative aspect
-1 = negative aspect




U.S. TO SOUTHERN CONE SHIP TRANSFER RECIPIENT FACTORS
AND RECIPIENT DESIRABILITY:










Average X 3 ^1_
2. PRESTIGE + 1


























7. EXPAND TRADE + 1 + 1 + 2
8. KEEP NAVY HAPPY + 1 + 1 + 1




RN: -0. 3 -1.3 +0.7
GN + 1.0 + 1.0 + 1.0
RD - + 1.7 +0.7 + 2.7
RF = recipient factor
RN = recipient need
GN = geopolitical need (determined in chapter three
RD = recipient desirability
= [ (RN) + (2 X GN)
]
key to recipient factors:
+2 = very positive aspect
+1 = positive aspect
= neither positive nor negative aspect
-1 - negative aspect






U.S. TO SOUTHERN CONE SHIP TRANSFER RECIPIENT FACTORS
AND RECIPIENT DESIRABILITY:
FRIGATE (FF)
RF ARGENTINA BRAZIL CHILE
1. ECONOMIC COST
Initial Cost + 1 + 1 + 1
Long Term Cost
fuel -1 -1 -1
manning + 2 + 2 + 2
maintenance
average -1. 5 -1. 5 -1. 5
Average -0. 3 -0. 3 -0.3
Averaqe X 3 -0. 9 -0. 9 -0. 9
2. PRESTIGE + 1 + 1 + 1






6. TECH TRANSFER + 2 + 2 + 2
7. EXPAND TRADE + 1 + 1 + 1
8. KEEP NAVY HAPPY + 2 + 2 + 2
9. DOMES. ARMS IND
.
-2 -1
10 .ARMS RACE -1 -1
RN + 4. 1 + 2. 1 + 4. 1
GN 0.0 -1.0 + 2.0
RD + 4. 1 +0. 1 + 8. 1
RF recipient factor
RN = recipient need
GN = geopolitical need (determined in chapter three)
RD = recipient desirability
= [ (RN) + (2 X GN)
]
key to recipient factors:
+2 = very positive aspect
+1 - positive aspect
= neither positive nor negative aspect
-1 = negative aspect




U.S. TO SOUTHERN CONE SHIP TRANSFER RECIPIENT FACTORS
AND RECIPIENT DESIRABILITY:










Average X 3 ^®.
2. PRESTIGE + 2

























4. COMMITMENT -1 -1 -1
5. LEVERAGE -1 -1 -1
6. TECH TRANSFER + 2 + 2 + 2
7. EXPAND TRADE + 1 + 1 + 2
8. KEEP NAVY HAPPY + 2 + 2 + 2
9. DOMES. ARMS IND
.
-1
10 .ARMS RACE -1 -1
RN + 1.9 + 0. 9 + 3.9
GN 0.0 0.0 0.0
RD + 1.9 +0.9 +3.9
RF = recipient factor
RN = recipient need
GN = geopolitical need (determined
RD = recipient desirability
= [ (RN) = (2 X GN)
]
in chapter three)
key to recipient factors:
+2 very positive aspect
+1 = positive aspect
= neither positive nor negative aspect
-1 = negative aspect




U.S. TO SOUTHERN CONE SHIP TRANSFER RECIPIENT FACTORS
AND RECIPIENT DESIRABILITY:









average -0. 7 -0.7
Average -0. 4 -0.4
Average X 3 -1. 2 -1. 2
PRESTIGE

















7. EXPAND TRADE + 1 + 1 + 2
8. KEEP NAVY HAPPY + 1 + 1 + 1
9. DOMES. ARMS IND. -1
10 .ARMS RACE
RN + 0. 3 -0.7 + 1.3
GN + 2.0 + 1.0 0.0
RD + 4.3 + 1.3 + 1.3
RF = recipient factor
RN = recipient need
GN = geopolitical need (determined in chapter three)
RD = recipient desirability
= [ (RN) = (2 X GN)
]
key to recipient factors:
+2 - very positive aspect
+1 = positive aspect
* neither positive nor negative aspect
-1 = negative aspect




The preceding tables have shown the impact of various
factors on a recipient's desire for a particular ship type.
Economic factors are generally the most important
consideration and they were computed as three times as
important as all the other recipient factors. The remaining
recipient factors were weighed evenly. The weighted RFs
determined recipient need. The geopolitical need for each
ship, as determined by geopolitical doctrine, was assumed to
be twice as important as the recipient need.
Table V.B-8 shows how each of the ABC countries would
rank the desirability of each of the ship types that the
U.S. fleet plans to decommission in the near future. It
indicates that both Argentina and Brazil would most desire a
U.S. -built fleet replenishment oiler; this is consistent
with the fact that neither of these countries has adequate
blue-water fuel support capability. Chile would most desire
a Knox-class frigate. This is also consistent in that Chile
currently has only two frigates for a country with a very
long coastline. Note also that the high ranking for DDGs
and FFs for each country coincides with the fact that the
U.S. will decommission more of these types of ships than any
other in the next decade.
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TABLE V.B-8
U.S. TO SOUTHERN CONE SHIP TRANSFERS;
OVERALL DESIRABILITY RANKINGS
(in order of decreasing desirability)
SHIP TYPE (RD in parenthesis)
ARGENTINA BRAZIL CHILE
1. AO (+4.3) AO (+1.3) FF (+8.1)
2. FF (+4.1) DDG(+0.9) DDG(+3.9)
3. DDG(+1.9) LPD(+0.7) CV (+3.5)
4. LPD(+1.7) BB (+0.5) BB (+3.5)
5. CV (+1.5) CV (+0.5) LPD(+2.7)
6. BB (+1.5) FF (+0.1) AO (+1.3)
7. LPH(-2. 5) LPH(-3. 5) LPH(-0. 5)
RD = recipient desirability
= [ (RN) + (2 X GN)
]
Source: author
C. CONCLUSION TO PART ONE
Part one has shown that each of the Southern Cone
countries—Argentina, Brazil, and Chile— has geopolitical
maritime interests that require a blue water naval
capability. Each of the ABC navies should have a relatively
strong desire for guided-missile destroyers and frigates.
Although two of the countries (Argentina and Brazil) have a
significant need for a replenishment oiler, the transfer of
this type of support ship does not carry with it the same
ramifications that the transfer of a warship does. For this
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reason, and because most of the future U.S. ship
decommissionings are scheduled to be DDGs and FFs, the
balance of this thesis will primarily address Adams - and
Coontz -class guided-missile destroyers and Knox-class
frigates
.
It is the purpose of the remainder of this thesis to
ascertain whether it is in the best interest of the United
States to transfer these types of ships to the Southern
Cone .
106
VI . U.S. SHIP TRANSFER PROCESS
The purpose of this chapter is to review the U.S. arms
transfer process in general and ship transfer procedures in
particular. The first section provides a brief overview of
the arms transfer process. The second section examines the
future feasibility of the following ship transfer methods:
sale of excess U.S. vessels, sale of craft built
specifically for export, coproduction , and lease.
A. ARMS TRANSFER PROCESS: AN OVERVIEW
The purpose of this section is to briefly summarize the
arms transfer process in the United States. Of particular
concern are the actors and agencies responsible for arms
transfer policy-making and approval.
Over 4,000 naval vessels have been transferred by the
United States to foreign nations since the end of World
War II. 154 Arms transfers are conducted via two main paths:
(1) sales and (2) security assistance.
1. Sales
Arms transfers are governed by the 1976 Arms Export
Control Act (AECA) . Arms are sold either commercially or
154Subcommittee on General Procurement, Senate Armed Services
Committee, Naval Ship Transfers (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1980), 2.
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through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process. Both
tracks follow similar U.S. government approval paths. FMS
contracts are overseen by the U.S. government whereas
commercial contracts only come to the government's attention
when the arms company applies for an export license. Most
foreign customers prefer FMS largely because the Department
of Defense acts as the purchasing agent and negotiates with
the American manufacturer on their behalf. 155
There are certain categories of arms sales that,
under the AECA, the President may designate as FMS-only
transfers. The four key criteria that determine if a FMS-
only sale will be designated are: (1) legislative or
Presidential restrictions; (2) DOD or Service policies,
directives, or regulatory requirements, such as National
Disclosure Policies; (3) government-to-government agreement
requirements; and (4) interoperability or safety
requirements for U.S. forces. This last criteria has been
applied to ship transfers to the Southern Cone. 156
When the Navy has determined that a vessel is no
longer fit for further USN service, it is stricken from the
Naval Vessel Register and may be sold to a foreign country.
In this instance, the title passes to the recipient.
155For a discussion of FMS versus commercial sales, see Paul
L. Ferrari, Jeffrey W. Knopf, and Raul L. Madrid, U.S. Arms
Exports: Policies and Contractors (Washington, D.C.: Investor
Responsibility Research Center, 1987), 51.
156See Defense Trade News . Vol 2 No 2, April 1991, 14.
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Price determination for ship sales are provided by
the Defense Property Disposal and Ship Sales Office in
Newport, Rhode Island. The price is based on the estimated
market appraisal and past history on sales of the same type
ship. The base price is increased to cover the amount of
spare parts on board, and the amount and condition of
equipment remaining on board. The price is for the ship
only and does not include towing, reactivation, overhaul,
training, or other costs which often come up at the time of
transfer and must be paid for by the recipient. Crew
training can be provided under a separate contract.
"Hot ship" transfers, or those in which the U.S. crew
essentially turns the ship over as is to the foreign crew,
eliminate the costs of inactivation and storage (paid for by
the U.S.), as well as that of reactivation (paid by the
recipient). Hot ship transfers, thus, provide the foreign
navy with ships that can be sailed away immediately, and are
therefore the most desirable and cost effective method of
transfer.
Finally, the contractual terms of a sale include
restrictions against the recipient retransferring the title,
possession of the ship or any component or associated
support material furnished under the sales agreement, to any




There are two security assistance programs that
pertain to ship transfers: (1) FMS credit program and
(2) Military Assistance Program (MAP). FMS credits are U.S.
government guaranteed loans which can include favorable
interest rates and mild repayment schedules.
MAP involves grants that countries use to obtain
military equipment and services. Both FMS and MAP enable
foreign governments that are unable to afford the full price
to finance weapon purchases. They are also used for
governments that have been deemed deserving of financial
assistance for other reasons.
The primary determinant as to whether the U.S. sells
or leases a vessel is based on the U.S. Navy's potential
requirement for it. If there is no requirement for it, and
it is therefore declared a ship excess, selling it is the
only transfer option. If there is some potential
requirement for a vessel, though it is not needed at the
time, then leasing is the only available transfer method. 157
In the case of a ship lease, the consideration is the
157Interview with Joseph W. Bowab, Bureau of Politico-Military
Affairs, Office of Defense Relations and Security Assistance,
Department of State, 27 September 1991, Washington, D.C.
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country's agreement to maintain the vessel in as good or
better condition than it was on the date of transfer. 158
3. Arms Transfer Approval
Once a formal FMS request for arms is submitted, the
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (PM) of the State
Department has primary responsibility for deciding whether
to approve the request. The DOD , including the Defense
Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) and the politico-military
offices of both the DOD and OPNAV, also have a say in arms
sales decisions. The DSAA is the primary manager of the FMS
program. The other major agency in the arms transfer
approval process is the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
(ACDA) which mainly ascertains the possible effect of a
proposed transfer on regional stability.
Most arms transfers requests are not controversial.
Usually, the primary decision-makers will agree on how to
respond to a particular request. In a disputed transfer,
other review agencies, such as the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) and the Treasury and Commerce Departments may
play significant roles. In the rare instance that a
consensus cannot be reached, the Secretary of State may
158Testimony of Rear Admiral T.A. Almstedt, Director, Security
Assistance Division, OPNAV, before the House Foreign Affairs
Committee in Authorize the Transfer of Nine Naval Vessels to
Certain Foreign Governments, and Other Matters (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), 4-5.
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defer the final decision to the National Security Council
(NSC). Ultimately, the President makes the final decision.
4. Congressional Responsibility
The AECA requires that arms sales valued at more than
$1 million must be reported to Congress. Congress, however,
can only turn down transfers that exceed $14 million.
Second-hand ship sales typically exceed this amount.
Congress has 30 days in which it can pass a joint resolution
of disapproval.
To date. Congress has never vetoed a ship transfer
request to anywhere in the world. Because the recipient
anticipates approval once the President decides in favor of
a transfer, subsequent Congressional rejection may damage
U.S. credibility and relations with that country. 159
Congress' specific concerns regarding ships transfers have
been few. 160
B. FUTURE METHODS OF SHIP TRANSFERS TO THE SOUTHERN CONE
This section will determine the practicality of four
common methods of transferring ships: (1) sale of
decommissioned or excess vessels; (2) sale of craft
159Brzoska and Ohlson, Arms Transfers to the Third World. 1971-
85 , 52.
160The assessment that Congress historically has had a general
lack of concern toward U.S. ship transfers is based on extensive
review of Congressional Hearings dating back to early 1960s.
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specifically built for foreign use; (3) coproduction of
U . S . -designed ships; and (4) lease of excess craft.
1. Sale of Excess Vessels
The ships of concern in this thesis, the Adams -
.
Coontz , and Knox-classes , have not been declared excess and
so cannot be sold to foreign countries. There have been few
vessels sold to the Southern Cone in the past few decades.
Ships that are excess to the U.S. fleet are often not
desired by these countries due to age and obsolescence.
Also, purchase costs, including reactivation, are often
prohibitive. Finally, while there has been ABC interest in
leasing U.S. ships, there has been little enthusiasm
expressed by any of the ABC countries for buying excess U.S.
naval vessels. In short, there are likely to be few, if
any, future warship sales to the Southern Cone.
2. Sale of Craft Built For Export
The United States does not normally construct ships
for export. Other industrial countries, such as Germany,
have found a niche in the world market by producing export
models of ships or submarines used in their own fleet.
There are two main reasons why the U.S. is unlikely
to build ships for export to the Southern Cone. First, the
purchase cost of major warships prohibits these financially-
strapped countries from affording them. Second, the DOD and
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Navy has long shied away from programs that could either
(a) possibly result in the production of platforms by U.S.
shipyards that were no longer desired by the U.S. or
(b) result in transfer of critical construction technology.
The DOD believes that Congress is less likely to allocate
funding for new platforms as long as foreign orders for
other vessels are keeping U.S. shipyard workers employed.
Also, especially in submarine construction, the Navy feels
that it can't help but transfer critical construction
technology in new export ships. Recently, the Egyptian
government requested that U.S. shipyards construct German-
designed diesel submarines for the Egyptian Navy. Even
though such a program would have helped keep a dwindling
pool of submarine workers employed, the Under Secretary of
the Navy, the CNO, and the Assistant CNO for Undersea
Warfare (OP-02) squelched the initiative because they
believed that critical submarine fabrication technology
would be compromised and due to traditional fears of
endangering U.S. nuclear submarine funding. 161 In short,
all factors indicated that the U.S. will not produce
warships for export to the Southern Cone in the near future
161Interview with Mr. W.A. Wither, Head OP-615, International
Programs Branch, Washington, D.C., 28 September 1991. See also
David Silverberg, "Navy Says No to Bid by Ingalls For Subs,"
Defense News , 26 August 1991, 4. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney
recently ordered a DOD study of the Egyptian request. Defense
News . 11 November 1991, 2.
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3. Coproduction
Coproduction of naval warships occurs when the
recipient ultimately receives both the ship and also related
production technology. The U.S. has never participated in
such a transfer with the Southern Cone involving ships, but
has conducted coproduction deals with Argentina and Brazil
consisting of aircraft.
Coproduction allows the Third World recipient to
establish, enhance, or maintain a domestic shipbuilding
industry. In order to acquire this technology, the
recipient stipulates that such technology transfers
accompany purchase of the ship. Technology transfer has a
variety of meanings:
The sale of blueprints and technical data for the
production of complete weapon systems by another country;
the sale of components, machine tools, and manufacturing
know-how for the assembly of such items; the provision of
training and technical assistance in the introduction of
new production processes; and the sale of complete
factories or production lines with all the parts and
machines needed to operate them. Such transactions can
also involve one-way transfers, whereby the U.S.
government ... provides another government ... with the
technology to produce a given weapon or component for its
own use, or collaborative ventures, wherein the U.S.
government ... provides such expertise as part of an
agreement for the joint production of a given item for the
use of both. 162
The costs involved in coproduction are similar to
conventional sales costs because in the end, a new product
is produced. As stated earlier, none of the ABC countries
162Michael T. Klare, American Arms Supermarket (Austin
University of Texas Press, 1984), 163-164.
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are currently able to afford new ships, whether they are
built abroad or domestically with foreign technology.
4. Method of Choice: Lease
The most popular method of ship transfer to the
Southern Cone in the past has been the lease option.
Economically, it is the most affordable method for the Third
World recipient. In a typical testimony to Congress, the
CNO's Director of Security Assistance briefed Congress on
some of the advantages of leasing inactive ships:
The Foreign nation, then, is required to lease these
ships and pay all the costs to renovate them and put them
into operating condition, so we are getting a better ship
at their expense.
Then they are required under the terms of the lease to
maintain it in that condition, so that is kind of a rent
charge. Furthermore, the background is that these ships
generally are more important or do more for us than they
actually do for the foreign country.
They also, incidentally, create business because they
are overhauled here in our country. So in actuality, I
think, we are really charging them lease money or rent. 163
Another important factor, in light of President Bush's
reconstitution strategy, 164 is that lease terms allow the
163Rear Admiral T.A. Almstedt, in testimony before the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, 21 September 1982, 12.
164The reconstitution strategy refers to the concept of,
following the current personnel and equipment drawdown, generating
the forces and arms necessary to fight a new global military
threat. The strategy assumes that the U.S. would have at least two
years of warning before hostilities. Naval ships in mothballs
could be reactivated and any ships leased to foreign navies could
be recalled. See James J. Tritten, America Promises to Come Back:
A New National Strategy Technical Report (Monterey: Naval
Postgraduate School, 1991).
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retransfer of the ship back to the U.S. in time of crisis.
Although this clause has never been invoked on a transferred
ship to date, it may turn out to be valuable in the future.
The overall advantages of the lease method and its economic
feasibility for Southern Cone countries, make it the best
ship transfer method for the future. Thus, the remainder of




VII . ADVANTAGESS OF FUTURE WARSHIPTRANSFERS TO THE SOUTHERN CONE
This chapter will analyze the political and military
advantages for the United States should it choose to conduct
transfers of U.S. naval warships to the countries of the
Southern Cone in the future. The foreign policy-making
process largely consists of weighing the advantages of a
certain policy against the disadvantages of implementing
that particular policy. The objective of this chapter,
along with the subsequent chapter, is to examine the
advantages and disadvantages of future warship transfers to
the Southern Cone. This serves to construct a balance of
pros and cons that policy-makers consider before executing a
foreign policy.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reported the various
rationale for arms transfer programs:
In support of U.S. interests, the strategic objectives of
the program are as follows: (1) to assist countries vital
to U.S. national interests in preserving their
independence and regional security, (2) to help secure
access, overflight, transit and forward basing rights,
(3) to promote standardization and interoperability of
military forces, (4) to ensure continued access to
critical raw materials, (5) to provide a vehicle for
maximizing U.S. influence abroad ... Secondarily, the U.S.
security assistance program also contributes to U.S.
domestic goals by helping to expand the industrial base,
lower unit costs of equipment production, [and] maintain
U.S. employment in key industries... 165
165Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Military Posture. FY
1984
,
quoted in Ferrari, Knopf and Madrid, 56-57.
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The U.S. Navy's Office of Plans, Policy and Operations
for Western Hemisphere has specified a number of its
objectives for Latin America. 166 These include:
(1) support national military strategy, including SLOC
protection; (2) reverse impression of U.S. disinterest in
Latin America; (3) reestablish contact with Latin American
naval officers; (4) integrate the Latin American navies into
the world community (e.g., contribute to U.N. military
coalitions); and (5) maintain and increase U.S. access to
ranges and other regional training opportunities.
This chapter will explore the objectives of both the
Joint Chiefs and Navy in considering the benefits of warship
transfers to the Southern Cone.
A. OVERLAP OF U.S AND SOUTHERN CONE
NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS
An important advantage of transferring U.S. naval
warships to the Southern Cone is that it is in the United
States' national security interest to have well-armed,
professional Southern Cone navies. This is becoming ever
more critical as budget constraints cause the reach of U.S.
Navy influence to recede. This is especially true in the
Southern Pacific and Southern Atlantic oceans which the U.S.
166Captain Patrick Roth, Head OP-613, Office of Plans, Policy
and Operations for the Western Hemisphere, in a presentation at the
Naval Postgraduate School, 10 September 1991.
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Navy has virtually ignored due to the cold war preoccupation
with a North Atlantic war-fighting scenario.
As the Western Hemisphere gradually develops into a
regional economic zone, and as the diminishment of the
Soviet threat makes the Northern Atlantic relatively less
important to U.S. national security interests, U.S. military
interests are likely to refocus closer to home.
Additionally, drug interdiction demands a naval capability
positioned astride the major trafficking routes off the west
and east coast of South America. Regional stability
requires U.S. naval interests to be refocused towards the
Western Hemisphere. The dilemma is that traditional, non-
Western Hemispheric naval deployment areas still require a
U.S. naval presence at the same time that the U.S. naval
fleet is being reduced to at least 425 ships. In other
words, U.S. naval commitments have decreased negligibly
concurrent with a drastic numerical fleet reduction. This
implies that fleet commanders will be hard-pressed to divert
scarce resources to the Western Hemisphere, despite its
increasing importance.
At the same time, the navies of the Southern Cone are
searching for a mission. These democratic governments have
taken steps to reduce their military's traditional domestic
focus in order to strengthen civilian rule.
There are four major areas where the national security
interests of the United States and the Southern Cone
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overlap. It is in these areas that the United States could
substitute Southern Cone for U.S. naval presence.
1. Antarctica
As explained in Chapter I, the Antarctic is integral
to the geopolitical interests of each of the Southern Cone
countries. The land and ocean resources of the region,
along with the continent's valuable scientific research
contribution, makes this region of considerable importance
to the United States as well. 167
On 04 October 1991, the United States, along with the
25 other consultative countries, agreed to sign a treaty
that bans mining on the Antarctic continent for at least
fifty years. Support for the accord is largely due to the
lasting ecological effects the Exxon Valdez oil spill
disaster had on a similar environment in Alaska. 168 The
treaty will not go into effect until all 26 countries ratify
the agreement.
2. South Atlantic Sea Lines of Communication
Over 13 percent of the United States' imported supply
of petroleum is shipped via the Persian Gulf, around the
167See Ron Scherer, "Plumbing the Southern Ocean," The
Christian Science Monitor . 14 August 1991, 10-11.
168Ron Scherer, "Support Grows to Protect Antarctic," The
Christian Science Monitor , 17 April 1991, 6.
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Cape of Good Hope, and through the South Atlantic into
seaports in the Gulf of Mexico and the East Coast. 169 The
Department of Energy (DOE) predicts that U.S. reliance on
foreign petroleum will rise from 42 percent of consumption
in 1989 to 62 percent in the year 2000, and 70 percent in
2010. 170 A reliable supply of oil is critical to U.S.
economic interests and this implies control of the South
Atlantic SLOCs.
Similarly, Argentina, Brazil, and to a lesser extent,
Chile, rely on this same SLOC for a majority of their
imported oil. These countries were especially hard hit with
the increase in oil prices following the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait. Therefore, the Southern Cone countries depend on
Persian Gulf oil to a significant degree to sustain their
domestic oil appetite and economic growth.
3. South Atlantic and South Pacific Resource Zones
The ocean waters off the west and east coasts of
South America are extremely rich fishing grounds and contain
deposits of oil. Although the coastal waters are off-limits
to U.S. -based fishing fleets, the deeper waters farther
offshore are equally abundantly stocked. The wealth of
169Matthew L. Wald. "Gulf Victory: An Energy Defeat?," The New
York Times . 18 June 1991, CI.
170John Dillin, "Emerging Plans Aim to Cut US Oil Imports," The
Christian Science Monitor , 07 February 1991, 1.
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undersea food resources located in these waters is no secret
to the fishing fleets of the rest of the world. Soviet and
other eastern European fishing ships regularly ply these
areas. A relatively recent onslaught of Japanese and
Taiwanese boats, often employing ocean-raping drift nets,
are a common sight in the South Atlantic and South Pacific.
If world-wide food supplies tighten due to poor regional
harvests and a burgeoning world population, the protection
of these food resources will become more critical to the
South American countries. The U.S. has recently attempted
to effect a world-wide ban on the use of drift nets, but
their use is still widespread by Taiwan and South Korea. 171
In sum, it is in the national security interests of the
Southern Cone countries as well as the United States to
protect the valuable marine food supply of the South
Atlantic and South Pacific.
4. Drug Interdiction
One of President Bush's stated national security
objectives for the 1990s is to reduce the flow of illegal
drugs into the United States by combatting international
171Japan recently agreed to ban drift-net practices by the end
of 1992. Taiwan and Korea are the next largest drift-net users
behind Japan. Scott Sonner, "Japan Agrees to Ban Drift-Net
Fishing," Monterey Herald (Associated Press), 26 November 1991, 2C.
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traffickers. 172 Since 1985, the U.S. drug interdiction
effort in Latin America has involved the use of military
forces. Whether it is Special Forces advisors in Bolivia,
P-3 aerial reconnaissance off the Pacific coast of Colombia,
or naval warships patrolling the Caribbean and the Gulf of
Mexico, the U.S. armed forces have been assigned a role in
the war on drugs. 173 The drug interdiction assignment could
turn out to be a salvation in light of the decline of the
traditional Soviet threat and concomitant defense
cutbacks. 174 The 1988 National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) ordered the DOD to serve as the lead agency for the
detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of
illegal drugs into the United States. In FY 1988, funding
allowed the Navy and Marines to provide 2,037 ship days in
support of Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDETS) at a cost of
$24 million. 175
172National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1991), 3.
173See James Painter, "US-Trained Bolivians Gear Up for Drug
War," Christian Science Monitor . 25 June 1991, 4; Ronald J. Ostrow,
"Mexico OKs U.S. Overflights to Detect Drug Smugglers," Los Angeles
Times . 26 January 1991, A22.
174See Donald J. Mabry, "The Role of the U.S. Military in the
War on Drugs," in Mabry (ed.) The Latin American Narcotics Trade
and U.S. National Security (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), 76.
175In FY 1987, the Navy provided about 2,500 ship days
resulting in 20 vessel seizures, 110 arrests, and confiscation of
225,000 pounds of marijuana and 550 pounds of cocaine, at a total
cost of $540 million. Bruce Bagley, "The Myth of Militarization:
An Evaluation of the Role of the Military in the War on Drugs in
the Americas," in Robert J. Kurtz (ed.) Proceedings of the Latin
America Strategy Development Workshop (Washington, D.C.: National
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The militaries of the Southern Cone are faced with
similar dilemmas of mission definition. Drug use and
trafficking now occurs regularly in each of the ABC nations
and is beginning to constitute a significant security threat
to the region. 176 Drug interdiction, however, is not
currently a stated mission of any of the ABC militaries.
Further, the Southern Cone militaries have hesitated to
become involved in the drug war effort. The possibility
exists that due to a lack of a credible mission and the
effect this has on military budgets, the ABC armed forces
may follow the U.S. military's lead and adopt drug
interdiction as one of its primary future purposes.
Ties between U.S. and Southern Cone drug efforts in
drug interdiction are now being established. The United
States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is currently
increasing its cooperation with the Brazilian government and
is spending more money in that country. 177
The dilemma in employing Southern Cone naval units in
the drug war is that the effectiveness of the military
Defense University, 1990), 92.
176See, for example, Eric Ehrmann, "Drug Barons Target
Argentina," Journal of Commerce . 22 September 1989; James Brooke,
"A Brazilian Border State Becomes Cocaine Route," New York Times .
20 August 1991, A4 ; Loreto Beiger, "Dealers Set Up Shop in Chile,"
Times of the Americas
. 02 October 1991, 5; and Rodolfo A.
Windhausen, "Southern Cone: More Than Just a Transit Point," Times
of the Americas . 20 February 1991, 10.
177See Julia Michaels, "Brazil's Drug War Extends To Its
Congress," Christian Science Monitor
.
10 September 1991, 5.
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effort to interrupt the flow of drugs is questionable at
best. According to recent studies published by the Inter-
American Commission on Drug Policy and the Government
Accounting Office (GAO), the U.S. military effort has not
been totally effective. 178 DOD officials, on the other
hand, contend that the military's efforts have met with a
considerable degree of success. 179 The potential usefulness
of assigning Southern Cone navies a drug interdiction
mission, then, is equally controversial. If, despite the
debatable usefulness of employing the military to combat
drug trafficking, the U.S. government chooses to continue to
commit its naval resources toward the drug war, then it
would be cost effective to encourage the support of the
Southern Cone navies in this effort. The transfer of U.S.
naval warships would serve to enhance the effectiveness of
these navies to perform this task. It is likely that drug-
exporting countries would prefer to have Latin American
navies patrolling their waters than U.S. warships. 180
178See John Dillin, "US Wasting Funds in Drug Effort,"
Christian Science Monitor . 12 June 1991, 8; and William Matthews,
"GAO, DOD Conflict on Drug War Assessment," Navy Times .
04 November 1991, 24. See also Lee Hamilton, "Effort to Attack
Drugs at Source Falters, " Christian Science Monitor . 17 July 1991,
19.
179Matthews, 24.
180In December 1989 Colombia protested against the possibility
that U.S. naval vessels were to be positioned off its coast to
search for drug-running ships.
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One potential drawback to enlisting the aid of these
navies in the drug war is the possibility of military
corruption. Bribery has often accompanied military drug war
involvement in other countries. Some believe that this
could lead to a corrupted political process resulting in a
new round of military regimes. 181
In short, the effectiveness of bringing the Southern Cone
navies into the drug war is debatable at best, and it could
possibly result in a corruption of the military and the
entire political establishment. If, however, the U.S.
remains committed to the military option, then it might be
an advantage to have the ABC navies contribute to the
effort
.
B. HEMISPHERIC SECURITY BURDEN-SHARING
The overlap of American and Southern Cone security
interests described above indicates the feasibility of
proposing a mutual security pact. An agreement of this type
could possibly include the transfer of regional maritime
security responsibilities from the U.S. Navy to the navies
of the ABC countries. One of the major justifications for
U.S. naval arms transfers to these countries during the Cold
War was to relieve the area obligations of the U.S. fleet so
181James Malloy, Professor of Political Science at the
University of Pittsburgh Center for International Studies, in
Kurtz, 110.
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that it could concentrate on the North Atlantic. With the
Soviet threat diminished, combined with a significant draw-
down of U.S. naval forces, it remains critical that the
Southern Cone navies continue to be able to project maritime
power for the protection of mutual national security
interests. One of the President's stated national security
objectives is to establish a more balanced partnership with
allies and a greater sharing of responsibilities. 182 The
1991 U.S. National Security Strategy states:
our strategy is increasingly dependent on the support of
regional friends and allies. In fact--during crises--the
cooperation and support of those local states most
directly threatened will be critical factors in
determining our own course of action. 183
In this light, the transfer of relatively sophisticated
warships can be justified. The SAM capabilities of the
Adams - and Coontz -class would significantly upgrade the AAW
defense capacity of these navies. The Knox -class would
improve the ASW efficacy in the region. The addition of any
of these ships would improve the blue-water potential and
status of these maritime forces.
Another advantage to having second-hand U.S. ships
employed by Southern Cone navies is related to the ability
of the navy to reconstitute itself in the future. President
Bush's "Reconstitution Strategy" calls for the armed forces
182National Security Strategy of the United States . 3
183Ibid., 28.
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to be able to form a credible defense to a Soviet level
threat with about two years' notice. 184 For the U.S. Navy,
this could involve the reactivation of ships in the inactive
reserve. One lesson learned from Desert Shield and Desert
Storm was that it took much longer than expected to
reactivate mothballed vessels. In this case, the ships were
not activated in time to participate in the war effort. The
advantage, then, of transferring these ships under lease is
that under terms of the lease, the U.S. Navy can repossess
the ships in time of crisis. These ships would be available
for U.S. Navy use much sooner than mothballed ships.
Furthermore, ships retransf erred back to the U.S. may
already be stocked with ammunition and supplies. This would
reduce even further the time before the platform could be
employed in hostilities.
Before the U.S. decides to take back leased ships, it
should consider the possible negative political
ramifications associated with such a move. Recipient
governments may resent losing these ships. If the threat
that prompts a U.S. force reconstitution is also considered
a threat by the recipient, the leaser may prefer to keep the
ship in order to provide maritime security for itself.
Finally, problems may surface that could reduce the
184Ibid., 29-30.
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feasibility of retransf erring these vessels to the U.S.
fleet.
In sum, the transfer of U.S. warships to the Southern
Cone would reenforce the ability of the ABC navies to defend
common regional interests and could serve to improve the
reconstitution time of the U.S. Navy.
C. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS OF RECIPIENT COUNTRIES
In light of the mutual security interests between the
United States and Southern Cone, and considering the
economic difficulties of these countries, the transfer of
U.S. warships under a no-cost lease would be the cheapest
way for these navies to acquire ships of significant
capability. None of these countries can afford either
serious shipbuilding programs or purchase of new warships.
The addition of ex-U.S. frigates and destroyers may be the
only feasible way these navies can continue to upgrade their
forces. 185 An example of the U.S. Navy's philosophy
regarding the transfer of excess vessels that still applies
today, was stated by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO),
Admiral Holloway, during Congressional hearings on proposed
ship transfers to Argentina and Colombia in 1976:
185Argentina, for example, is exploring the possibility of
purchasing relatively inexpensive surplus military equipment (not
ships) from the U.S. in order to reorganize it services over the
next five to eight years. See J.C. d'Odorico, "Argentina's
Modernization Plan Could Send Surplus US Equipment South," Armed
Forces Journal International . September 1991, 26.
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Although these vessels are no longer capable of the
extended deployments or rigorous use concomitant with
service in the United States Navy, they provide a
significant improvement in the naval capabilities of the
foreign countries. The increased capabilities of our
allies strengthen our mutual defense agreements and
benefit the defense posture of the United States. 186
Under a no-cost lease, the only expenditure involved in
obtaining a ship would be the cost of refurbishing it out of
mothballs. This cost, which is sometimes high enough to be
prohibitive to potential recipients, can be considerably
reduced by a hot transfer from the U.S. crew to the
recipient crew. This means that if U.S. policy-makers
decide to transfer these ships, they should attempt to
control the decommissioning rates of these ship classes to
coincide with the projected delivery dates to the foreign
navy. In sum, it may be that the only way the navies of the
Southern Cone can afford to continue to build and improve
their forces is to receive no-cost leases from the United
States
.
D. APPEASES MILITARY IN POST-AUTHORITARIAN DEMOCRACIES
Exporting democracy and containing Communism has been a
U.S. foreign policy goal throughout the Cold War. In the
post Cold War era, U.S. interests are focused on preventing
186Admiral J.L. Holloway, CNO, quoted in Hearings on S.3734 to
Approve the Sale of Certain Naval Vessels, and For Other Purpose s
,
before the House Subcommittee on Seapower and Strategic and
Critical Materials, 16 September 1976 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1976), 2.
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the return of military-led authoritarian regimes to the
Southern Cone. The President's stated national security
objectives include strengthening "the commonwealth of free
nations that share a commitment to democracy and individual
rights." 187
It is clear that democracy has not been fully
consolidated in any of the ABC countries. One has only to
look at the prerogatives the militaries of these countries
either possess or are attempting to reassert. Political
scientists that have studied democratic regime-breakdown
have derived lists of factors that determine the success or
failure of nascent democratic governments. 188 The one cause
of regime collapse of concern here is the role of the
military. Latin American countries, and the Southern Cone
in particular, have had a legacy of difficult civil-military
relations. Often, the military in an unconsolidated
democratic regime serves as the " poder moderador " . the real
power behind the elected government. 189 According to Alain
187National Security Strategy of the United States , 3.
188See Larry Diamond and Juan J. Linz, "Introduction: Politics,
Society, and Democracy in Latin America," in Diamond, Linz, and
Seymour M. Lipset (eds.) Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin
America, Volume 4 (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989 ) [hereinafter
"Diamond and Linz"]; Juan J. Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic
Regimes: Crisis. Breakdown. & Reeguilibration (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University, 1987); and Guillermo O'Donnell and Phillippe
C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative




Rouqui<§, "there is no doubt it is easier to demilitarize the
government than to remove the military from power." 190
Although the three countries studied here have made
significant strides to de-praetoritize their political
systems, the fact remains that each of these armed forces
still claims certain military prerogatives. 191 Long-term
disengagement by the military from ABC politics remains
uncertain. 192 In Chile, General Pinochet remains the de
jure Commander in Chief of the armed forces. In Argentina
and Brazil, the military has yet to completely forsake its
historical role as poder moderador .
The civil-military relationship is partly defined by the
degree of military contestation. 193 The decline of the
military budgets in Argentina and Brazil since the
installation of civilian rule has served as point of
190Alain Rouqui6, The Military and the State in Latin America
(Berkeley: University of California, 1989), 376.
191For a discussion of military prerogatives in newly
democratic regimes, see Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military
Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton: Princeton
University, 1988), Chapter 7.
192Claude E. Welch defines long-term military disengagement
from politics as "(1) a minimum of ten years during which at least
one successful 'regular' executive transition has occurred and
(2) during which the level and nature of military involvement in
politics have moved significantly from military 'control' to
military 'participation', or from military 'participation' to
military 'influence' in politics. See Welch, No Farewell to Arms?:
Military Disengagement From Politics in Africa and Latin America
(Boulder: Westview, 1987), 20.
193Stepan, 68. The other defining factor is the extent to
which the military maintains various prerogatives.
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considerable contestation. Recent rumblings over low pay is
one piece of evidence that the armed forces are not happy
about the cut in military spending. 194 Decreased budgets
have caused serious degradation to mission capability in
each of the ABC navies. Furthermore, the traditional anti-
Soviet orientation of these navies is no longer a valid one.
In short, these navies are ill-equipped and without a
legitimate and focused external defense mission. 195 The
result is that a military feels threatened for its very
existence. It is precisely this sort of situation that
often prompts the military to take over the government in
order to ensure adequate resources are directed to the armed
forces. According to political scientist Alfred Stepan,
One of the indirect background reasons that makes Third
World armies so eager to control the governments of their
countries ... is that they are acutely aware that they are
almost totally dependent on the importation of foreign
arms and they have no significant internal civilian
constituency with a structurally vested interest in arms
importation. .. This can become a military justification or
motivation for controlling the government and the nation's
budget. 196
194See Julia Preston, "Brazil's Brass Fights War of Words."
Washington Post . 14 July 1991.
195See James Brooke, "Latin Armies Are Looking for Work," New
York Times , 24 March 1991. The Brazilian Air Minister, in an
effort to win public support for military pay increases, recently
placed a full-page article in a large newsweekly advertising the
military's civic action work rather than extolling the merits of
traditional defense missions and equipment.
196Stepan, 84.
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The transfer of relatively affordable naval warships to
these nascent democracies, then, can contribute to their
democratic consolidation by providing the navies with the
types of arms necessary for external mission definition. In
other words, if the navies are suitably equipped, the naval
elite can focus on specifying appropriate externally-
concentrated objectives instead of possibly conspiring with
other branches of the armed forces to remove a civilian
government perceived as neglectful of the military. In
short, a navy without the types of ships it needs to
accomplish its geopolitically-determined aims is a potential
threat to democracy.
E. JOBS FOR U.S. INDUSTRY
The final advantage of transferring older U.S. warships
to the Southern Cone is that, historically, similar
transfers have served to maintain certain segments of U.S.
industry employed in the production of spare parts and
supplies. Maintaining the industrial base is a U.S.
security objective. 197 The impact on the U.S. economy from
this logistics support is probably less pronounced than if
ships were being built for direct transfer, but it is an
economic contribution nonetheless. In older ships, it
sometimes occurs that original part manufacturers have gone
197National Security Strategy of the United States . 30.
135
out of business. When a particular part fails, a new
company is contracted to tool up to produce the component.
If these older U.S. ships were to be mothballed instead of
transferred, U.S. industry, lacking a demand for spares,
will re-tool to accommodate other clients. This means that
should the U.S. fleet be required to reconstitute, U.S.
industry would be unprepared to provide parts support. By
transferring some of these ships, then, the Navy can ensure
it has suppliers for the types of parts that may be needed
by the remaining mothballed vessels in a future
reconstitution scenario. In some cases, the companies that
had been providing parts support will suffer a drop in
contracts and may not even be able to stay economically
viable as the ships are placed into the inactive reserve.
Either way, the U.S. economy is affected by the implications
of higher unemployment. In sum, the continuity of parts
contracts resulting from the transfer of these older U.S.
ships to the Southern Cone is advantageous to U.S.
industry.
F. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION TO CHAPTER VII
This chapter has outlined the advantages of transferring
U.S. warships to the Southern Cone. Overlapping U.S-
Southern Cone maritime security interests, including the
Antarctic, South Atlantic SLOCs, South Atlantic and South
Pacific ocean resources, and drug interdiction, indicate
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that strong ABC navies would serve U.S. security interests.
As the U.S. Navy's budget and forces are cut back while
world-wide deployment commitments remain nearly the same, it
would be a benefit to the U.S. if the Southern Cone navies
could be relied upon to handle these types of mutual
security missions. This can be accomplished by continuing
UNITAS-type navy-to-navy exercises and bolstering the
maritime order of battle by transferring older U.S.
warships. It has also been argued that the only practical
way for the financially-strapped ABC navies to afford
technologically advanced warships is to lease U.S. Adams -
,
Coontz - , and Knox-class ships. Mission capable ABC navies
may even preempt notions by Southern Cone naval elite to
plan military coups with disillusioned or frustrated leaders
from other service branches. Promoting Southern Cone
democratic political institutions that encourage the highest
levels of human rights, economic and social standards, is an
important element of the United States' national security
policy.
Arms transfers have historically been used to strengthen
the political and military ties between the supplier and
recipient. The transfer of these warships would serve a
similar purpose. 198 Lastly, U.S. industry would benefit by
19BInterview with former Assistant Secretary of State for
InterAmerican Affairs, Elliot Abrahms, 09 July 1991, Monterey,
California.
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keeping equipment and spare parts personnel employed after
the decommissioning of these ships from the U.S. fleet.
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VXXX - DISADVANTAGES OF TRANSFERRING
NAVAL WARSHIPS TO THE SOUTHERN CONE
The purpose of this chapter is to examine those aspects
of U.S. naval warship transfers to the Southern Cone that
could be considered disadvantages to the U.S. government and
U.S. Navy. 199
A. ABC NAVIES COULD POSE A THREAT TO THE U.S. NAVY, U.S
GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS. OR TO U.S. ALLIES
The potential exists that ships transferred to the
Southern Cone could be used in a military context against
the U.S. Navy, against a navy of an U.S. ally, or against a
particular geopolitical interest of the United States. A
naval action of this sort, in which transferred U.S.
warships are used against American interests, could occur in
any of three possible scenarios.
1. Scenario #1: Friendly Government Turns Hostile
In this scenario, the government to which the ships
were transferred, presumably friendly to the U.S. at the
time of the transfer, could suddenly become belligerent to
the U.S. to the point of open naval hostilities. In the
199A summary of politico-military and economic costs of
exporting arms is provided in Catrina, Arms Transfers and
Dependence
.
71-72. The factors discussed in this paper are those
that the author believes figure most prominently in the debate over
future naval ship transfers to the Southern Cone.
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Southern Cone, the current state of relations between the
U.S. and these newly-democratic regimes is characterized by
cooperation and good will, possibly the best relations
experienced in several decades. President Saul Menem of
Argentina has been the most visible in repairing once
strained relations with the United States. 200
President Fernando Collor de Mello of Brazil has been
considerably more friendly toward the United States than his
predecessor, President Jose Sarney. This is largely due to
Brazil's desire to integrate into the First World by
reducing its external debt and revamping its economy.
Brazil desperately needs U.S. assistance to solve both of
these problems, either through direct debt reduction
programs or through U.S. influence with the World Bank and
other global lending agencies.
Finally, U.S. -Chilean relations have improved
dramatically since President Bush lifted arms sales
sanctions enacted in 1976 due to human rights violations by
the Pinochet regime and the assassination of Chilean Foreign
Minister Orlando Letelier in Washington, D.C. The only
major negative political incident between the two countries
200See Barbara Crossette, "Argentine, on Visit, Reports
Turnaround," The New York Times . 15 November 1991, A3. One of
Menem's three foreign policy priorities upon taking office was to
strengthen relations with the capitalist countries, particularly
the United States, in order to integrate Argentina into the world
economy and to resolve its debt crisis. See Roberto Russell and
Laura Zuvanic, "Argentina: Deepening Alignment With the West,"
Journal of InterAmerican Studies and World Affairs , Fall 1991, 114.
140
was the 1989 case of imported Chilean grapes that the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) claims were laced with
arsenic. This resulted in a five-day ban on Chilean grapes
that caused immediate financial distress to the Chileans and
a lasting political sensitivity in U.S. -Chilean
relations. 201 Despite this one incident, however. President
Aylwin has moved forward to improve the link between the two
countries. 202 Chile is earnestly working towards
integrating its relatively-advanced Latin American economy
with the U.S. via free trade contracts. 203 In sum,
it is in the best interests of each of the ABC countries to
continue the currently warm relations with the United
States. It therefore seems implausible that the current
democratic regimes would undertake any kind of military
action against U.S. interests, including naval hostilities
using transferred American warships.
2. Scenario #2: Friendly Regime Replaced by Belligerent
The second possible scenario is the situation where
the friendly government of the recipient country is
201See Shirley Christian, "Chile May Sue the U.S. Over Its Ban
on Grapes," The New York Times . 12 September 1990, A4
.
2C2See Muhoz and Portales, 99.
203See Clyde H. Farnsworth, "U.S. Signs Trade Pact With Chile,"
The New York Times . 02 October 1990, C5 and Thomas Kamm, "Chile
Seeks Closer U.S. Trade Ties," The Wall Street Journal , 08 January
1991.
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succeeded by a regime distinctly unfriendly towards the
United States, resulting in future open naval hostilities
against American interests.
In the Southern Cone, each of the ABC countries is
nurturing nascent democracies that overcame military rule
(Argentina, 1983; Brazil, 1985; and Chile, 1990). In each
case the military continues to hold varying degrees of
prerogatives. Argentina and Brazil have achieved the
greatest degree of civilian control of the military to date.
Chile's General Pinochet, who remains the head of the
Chilean armed forces, maintains considerable political
power.
There are two main questions that should be addressed
concerning military rule and future arms transfers to the
Southern Cone. First, how likely is it that the military
will take over? Second, if it does assume power, will the
military adopt an unfriendly foreign policy posture towards
the U.S.? Another important question to be answered is
whether or not there exist political parties or movements
that have expressed hostile anti-U.S. sentiments and that
are politically viable. Is it possible the current
friendly, pro-U.S. government could be succeeded
democratically by an anti-U.S. regime that may possibly
choose to employ naval forces against U.S. interests?
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a. Stability of Argentine Government
The possibility of future military rule in the
Southern Cone varies from country to country. In Argentina,
President Menem has brought the military largely in line
with his own policies, domestic and foreign. In particular,
the Argentine Navy's strong desire to participate in Desert
Shield and Desert Storm was accommodated by Menem' s foreign
policy initiatives designed to bring Argentina back into the
forefront of global political participation. Menem also
received the military's backing when rebel soldiers
attempted a coup in December 1990. Lastly, Menem has
seemingly been successful in scrapping the Air Force's
coveted Condor II ballistic missile program. The technology
development associated with this program was placed firmly
under civilian control. Part of Menem's motivation in
terminating the military aspects of this program is that it
was considered an obstacle to better relations with the
United States. President Bush has ardently opposed the
missile program. 204
There have been some hints of unrest in the
Argentine military related to low pay. In a series of
incidents at various military installations in September
1990, disgruntled soldiers vandalized offices and vehicles.
204See "Argentine Missile Developments Placed Under Civil
Control," International Defense Review , September 1991, 908.
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The perpetrators were possibly connected to the carapintada
mutineers who have designated the imprisoned December 1990
coup attempt leader, Colonel Mohamed Ali Seineldin, as their
leader. In an attempt to defuse the situation, military pay
was increased by up to twenty-five percent. Funds raised
from the privatization of various defense industries are to
be used to supplement future defense budgets. 205 For now,
however, the boosted pay scales remain pitifully low
compared to the cost of living, leading some to believe that
pay-induced civil-military tensions may continue for some
time. 206 In sum, although some civil-military tensions
currently exist, the Argentine armed forces and the Navy in
particular, appear to be supportive of current civilian rule
and thus it is likely civilian rule will last for the
foreseeable future.
President Menem's political status is rising
largely due to the improving Argentine economy and in spite
of recent corruption charges against his administration. In
the 08 September 1991 gubernatorial and congressional
elections, Menem's Peronist party scored impressive
205Julia Michaels, "With World Bank Loan in Hand, Argentina
Moves Ahead to Reorganize Its Military," The Christian Science
Monitor . 03 October 1991, 5.
2ceSee "p ay Award Follows Spate of Unrest," Latin American
Weekly Report . 17 October 1991, 10.
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victories, underlining his political strength. 207 He is
seeking to capitalize on his popularity by attempting to
change the Argentine constitution so that he may serve
another five years as president. Even if he does not, there
are not any viable opposition parties proposing drastic
changes in foreign policy toward the U.S. The only known
nationalist group calling for a break with the U.S. is
Colonel Seineldin and his carapintada mutineers. The only
realistic chance to for them to attain power would be
through military coup, not via democratic elections. 208 In
sum, Argentina's government is likely to remain civilian-
ruled and pro-U.S. in the foreseeable future.
b. Stability of Brazilian Government
Brazilian civil-military relations are currently
strained. Severe budget restraints have resulted in low
morale for the Brazilian armed forces. The degraded spirit
is primarily due to extremely low pay, a slashed defense
budget, and a lack of a legitimate mission. 209 Discontented
top brass are lobbying for a military budget of five to six
percent of the national budget, instead of the current 3.7
207See Marcelo Cantelmi, "Peronists Rout Opposition," Times of
the Americas , 18 September 1991, 1.
208Ibid.




2 10 The military leadership is having difficulty
focusing on a overarching purpose for its existence, now
that the traditional cold war external threat has subsided.
Unfortunately, perhaps, for President Collor, the military
is gradually shifting toward a perceived internal threat, a
threat to Brazilian sovereignty, namely the international
environmental effort to save the Amazon rainforest. 211 A
renewed internal military focus conjures recent memories of
military anti-subversion activity that characterized the
most recent military regime from 1964 to 1985.
Although there exists military discontent with
the current civilian administration's policies, there have
been no clear indications that the military is prepared to
assume political power beyond discussion among a handful of
retired military officers. 212 There is virtually no talk
of a possible military coup. Nonetheless, left and center
political forces have called for an early plebiscite to
determine the future of the Brazilian constitution. There
appears to be growing support for the adoption of a
2ieLatin American Weekly Report . 12 September 1991, 3.
211 Ibid. This new focus of the Brazilian military was also
related by various Brazilian military officials during a recent
briefing visit to the Defense Department's politico-military
specialists at the Pentagon in September 1991. See also James
Brooke, "Brazil Creates Reserve for Imperiled Amazon Tribe," The
New York Times . 19 November 1991, A3. This newly emerging concern
is also shared, in part, by Argentina and Chile. See Latin
American Weekly Report . 29 August 1991, 4.
212Latin American Weekly Report . 29 August 1991, 4.
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parliamentary system in order to reduce Collor's
presidential powers which are being blamed for the country's
economic difficulties. The hope is that a parliamentary
system would avert the threat of military intervention. 213
Even if the military were to take over, there is no reason
to believe that it would result in such poor U . S . -Brazilian
relations that military hostilities would occur. U.S.
opposition to a military coup could, however, lead to a
chilling of relations to the extent that the Brazilian Navy
may not be able to be relied upon to conduct mutual security
missions
.
Collor's political future looks dim. His
popularity has plummeted drastically in 1991 because of
continued hyperinflation. His party controls only three
percent of the seats in Congress making it difficult for him
to pass legislation. 214 At this time, however, there are
no known virulently anti-U.S. political parties in Brazil
that could possibly rise to power in the next election.
c. Stability of Chilean Government
Chilean civil-military relations remain tense but
are easing. General Pinochet continues as the commander in
213See "'Understanding' Among All Others?," Latin American
Weekly Report
.
17 October 1991, 4.
214See James Brooke, "Brazil's Fresh Young President Has Grown
Old Fast," The New York Times . 20 October 1991, E4.
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chief of the Army and, under a 1980 constitution drafted to
his specifications, he can stay on until 1997 and he cannot
be fired. This constitution made the armed forces into the
virtual fourth branch of government and the "guarantor of
institutional order." 215 Pinochet remains popular with the
Chilean right-wing and with the military. On 08 January
1991, army generals declared their "unrestricted loyalty" to
Pinochet. 216 Investigations of human right abuses under
Pinochet by the military have resulted in no indictments or
convictions, largely because Pinochet has not allowed it.
Human rights investigations continue to occur. 217 This is a
potentially destabilizing issue for future civil-military
relations. The 01 April 1991 slaying of Chilean Senator and
Pinochet advisor Jaime Guzman followed a March 1991
government report criticizing the military and former secret
police for the deaths and disappearances of several thousand
people between 1973 and 1990. The Guzman assassination
215Brian Loveman, "£Misi6n Cumplida? Civil Military Relations
and the Chilean Political Transition," Journal of InterAmerican
Studies and World Affairs . Fall 1991, 46.
216William R. Long, "Chile Trying to Live With Democracy ... and
Pinochet," Los Angeles Times . 05 February 1991, H3.
217See Julia Michaels, "Chilean Activists Hail Moves on Human
Rights," The Christian Science Monitor . 24 October 1991, 4;
Nathaniel C. Nash, "Graves Without Name Yield Secrets," The New
York Times . 19 September 1991, A4 ; and "Abuses Under Pinochet Still
Surface," Washington Report on the Hemisphere , 16 October 1991, 1.
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prompted right-wing calls for a return to military rule 218
Many ordinary Chileans fear the military and prefer that the
government drop the human rights issue. 219
Pinochet has also been tied to several financial
scandals involving his own children, the military and the
Chilean Supreme Court. 220 These tribulations may have led
to recent statements indicating that he is prepared to step
down. 221 Should he retire, it could avert future
confrontation between the army and the civilian government
over human rights matters.
Indications of a reborn insurgency movement in
Chile has alarmed the civilian government because of the
military's demand for swift reaction. 222 The remote
possibility exists that, should the terrorist movement get
out of hand in the eyes of the armed forces, the military
may choose to seize power in order to deal with this
internal threat more efficiently. There is no indication,
218Nathaniel C. Nash, "A Slaying Inflames Chilean Rightists,"
The New York Times . 03 April 1991, A3.
219See Tim Frasca, "Chile Rights Report Stirs Nation," The
Christian Science Monitor . 04 April 1991, 3.
220See Henry Goethals, "Chilean Military Stained by Scandal,"
Times of the Americas . 14 November 1990, 2 and Roberto J.
Frisancho, "Official Probe Into 'La Cutufa'," Times of the
Americas
. 28 November 1990, 13.
221See Shirley Christian, "Pinochet Seems Willing to Yield Army
Control," New York Times . 22 January 1991, All.
222Nathaniel C. Nash, "Terrorism Jolts a Prospering Chile," The
New York Times . 09 April 1991, CI.
149
however, that the terrorist situation will ever get so bad
as to induce a coup. 223
The next Chilean presidential election is
scheduled for 1993. The economy is currently on the
downswing from past years of explosive growth, although it
is still far ahead of the Latin American average. 224 This
may hurt Aylwin's Christian Democratic party's chances of
winning the next presidential election. It is likely that
the next Chilean president will adopt a pro-U.S. stance.
Chile's right-wing political parties, Uni6n Dem6crata
Independiente (UDI) and Renovaci6n Nacional (RN), adhere to
anti-U.S. sentiments as part of their anti-imperialist
postures. Neither of these parties, however, currently has
a large public following. 225 In short, most Chileans have
embraced democracy, reject the military as a future
political power, and want better relations with the U.S. 226
223Current Chilean terrorist groups include the Manuel
Rodriguez Liberation Front (FPMR) with 500-1000 members. The other
main group is the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) which
has about 500 members. Both groups are headquartered in Santiago
and are anti-U.S. See Terrorist Group Profiles (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 94-98.
224Julia Michaels, "Slow Economy Worries Chileans," The
Christian Science Monitor . 26 September 1991, 8.
225Latin American Weekly Report . 14 November 1991, 6.
226See Julia Michaels, "Chileans Consolidate Democratic Gains,"
The Christian Science Monitor . 11 September 1991, 4.
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3. Scenario #3: Ships are seized by Insurgency Forces or
by an Unfriendly Country
The third and last scenario is where the ex-U.S.
warships, transferred to friendly countries, fall into the
possession of powers unfriendly to the United States. This
could occur either through the subsequent retransfer of the
warships from the original recipient to a third country or
by the illegal seizure of the warships from the friendly
recipient by internal or external hostile forces.
Under the terms of virtually all U.S. arms transfers,
recipients cannot retransfer arms without the explicit
approval of the United States. A country that chooses to
ignore this caveat risks undermining its relations with the
U.S. and destroying its future suitability as a recipient of
U.S. arms. Thus, it follows that an ABC country would not
retransfer a warship to a third country without U.S.
approval unless relations between that country and the U.S.
had already deteriorated, a situation that would fall under
the first scenario described above.
The illegal expropriation of transferred arms is not
too unusual. Guerrilla movements often confiscate U.S. -made
weapons as the spoils of a battle victory. An example would
be the FMNL in El Salvador which has such access to U.S.
arms because the U.S. supplies the El Salvadoran military
with equipment. In the case of naval warships, especially
frigate size and larger, as the discussion here involves, it
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is hardly conceivable that a guerrilla movement would be
able to steal, let alone win in battle, one of these capital
ships. It is therefore an extremely minor possibility to
consider when contemplating naval ship transfers to the
Southern Cone.
In sum, the possibility that transferred U.S.
warships would be employed against American interests seems
unlikely. In all the cases described, it would be a remote
possibility that any of the ABC navies under any
circumstances would initiate naval aggression against the
world's foremost military and naval power. The tenuous
civil-military relations in each country, though not
currently considered irreparable, should be taken into
account during the ship transfer consideration process.
B. NAVAL ARMS RACE
Another potential disadvantage of transferring warships
to one or more Southern Cone countries is the possible naval
arms race it may spawn. United States national security
interests include the reduction of military capabilities
that could provide incentives to initiate attacks. 227
Historically, Argentina and Brazil have engaged in a
military arms race, with each country vying to become the
first nuclear power in Latin America. This competitive
227National Security Strategy of the United States , 14
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relationship has begun to subside as evidenced by the rather
congenial, cooperative political relationship between the
two countries. Each has agreed to bide by a policy of
nuclear non-proliferation, although neither yet has signed
the Nuclear Non-Prolif eration Treaty (NPT). 228 President
Collor of Brazil ordered his military to cease nuclear
weapon development in September 1990. 229
With Argentina and Brazil each joining the new free trade
bloc MERCOSUR, the incentive for mutual cooperation has been
reinforced. It thus seems that these two countries have
overcome their historically antagonistic relationship in
which an arms race prevailed.
Chile still has an uneasy relationship with Argentina,
spurred on most recently by Chile's tacit support of Great
Britain in the Malvinas War. Chile still does not allow any
Argentine observers aboard its ships during the Chilean
phase of UNITAS. 230 Historically, there has not really been
an arms race between Chile and Argentina. One reason is
that Chile's economy, though relatively vibrant, is
considerably smaller than Argentina's and hence Chile could
228See Michael Wines, "Brazil Won't Sign Nuclear Pact but Plans
Curbs, Official Says," The New York Times . 17 October 1991, A4
.
See also Shirley Christian, "Argentina and Brazil Renounce Atomic
Weapons," The New York Times . 29 November 1990, Al.
229James Brooke, "Brazil Uncovers Plan by Military To Build
Atom Bomb and Stops It," The New York Times . 09 October 1990, Al
230Interview with Commander Thad Moyseowicz, OP-613,
26 September 1991, the Pentagon.
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never afford to purchase large weapon systems that Argentina
could. The other factor is that from 1976 to December 1990,
Chile suffered from a U.S. -led arms embargo that preempted
responding to Argentine arms purchases.
There is no historic precedence nor indication of an arms
race potential between Chile and Brazil. The three ABC
countries recently signed a declaration banning the
development, manufacture and use of chemical weapons. This
serves as a significant step towards overall regional
demilitarization and detensioning. 231 According to
Southern Cone arms and naval experts at the office of the
Chief of Naval Operations and the State Department, an arms
race among the Southern Cone countries is not a concern in
considering the transfer of U.S. warships. 232
C. PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH LOGISTICS SUPPORT
AND MAINTENANCE OF OLDER U.S. WARSHIPS
It was pointed out in the previous chapter that one
advantage to the U.S. of the transfer of older ships is that
it provides American industry with the opportunity to
provide long-term parts support for these platforms. This
231Nathaniel C. Nash, "3 Latin Nations Agree to Ban Chemical
Weapons," The New York Times . 06 September 1991, A3.
232Based on author's interviews with Commander Thad Moyseowicz,
OP-613; Commander George J. Murphy and Lieutenant Commander Robert
Kirk, OP-603 ; Mr. W.A. Withers, OP-615; and State Department Desk
officers John P. Caulfield (Brazil) and Mr. Ferrari (Argentina).
Interviews conducted in Washington, D.C., 26-27 September 1991.
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section addresses the issue of maintaining these twenty to
thirty-year-old ships. In many instances, the original
manufacturers of various ship equipment and machinery have
long since ceased to produce those particular parts. This
means that new manufacturers in the U.S. or in the recipient
country must tool up and begin to produce repair and
replacement parts. If a U.S. company is selected by the
recipient to produce these parts, it is a long-term benefit
to the American economy. More likely than not, however, the
recipient country will award repair part contracts to
indigenous vendors. Each of the ABC countries has a
significant industrial base capable of fabricating the
necessary parts. The negative aspect of repair and
replacement parts for the recipient is that there will tend
to be many required in such old platforms, therefore adding
to the long term costs of operating and maintaining them.
This burdens the already hampered ABC economies and
shrinking defense budgets.
Another related problem is that the engineering plants on
the Knox - . Adams- . and Coontz -class ships consist of high
pressure steam propulsion plants that are extremely
challenging to maintain. It is largely because of the
enormous difficulties encountered by the U.S. Navy with
these steam plants, combined with the fuel inefficiency of
their high-pressure oil-fired boilers, that the CNO has
opted to decommission them. It stands to reason that a
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future Southern Cone recipient will face the same laborious
maintenance difficulties. The potential disadvantage to the
U.S. is that the recipient is likely to blame the U.S. for
transferring the problem ship in the first place. It must
be noted, however, that the Navy International Programs
Office (NIPO), that coordinates the transfer of ships once
the CNO has approved their transfer, very carefully
indicates the negative aspects of the ship in question. 233
A detailed report of the cost of operating each potential
transfer is included in the Visibility and Management of
Operating and Support Costs-Ships (VAMOSC-SHIPS ) Reports
Catalog, prepared by the Naval Sea Systems Command. In
other words, there should be no cost surprises to the
recipient once it commissions the transferred ship into its
inventory. In the case of the recent transfer of the four
Garcia-class frigates to Brazil, there have no significant
problems in this area.
The other aspect of operating warships that are three
decades old warships is that, even if the recipient is fully
capable of acquiring parts support, the age of these
platforms predicts that they will require significant
periods of repair availability time. This means that these
ships will not be operationally available as much as a newer
platform would be. This reduces the overall effectiveness
233Interview with Commander Garmen, head of NIPO, 27 September
1991, Washington, D.C.
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of the recipient's navy, thus eroding the degree to which
the U.S. can rely on it.
In sum, although the long-term maintenance and operating
costs to the recipient of operating and maintaining older
U.S. warships is significant, the recipient is fairly warned
prior to the transfer of the exact expenses it should
anticipate
.
D. SOUTHERN CONE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DILEMMAS
The health of the ABC economies has significant
implications for the future of U.S. ship transfers to the
Southern Cone. It is commonly acknowledged that none of
these countries can afford expensive weapon system
purchases. Even if warships are designated excess to the
U.S. inventory and thus can be leased essentially free, the
recipient must absorb all the costs of preparing the ship
for transfer, which can be considerable. 234 Naval programs
are capital intensive because they involve more than ship
acquisitions. Shore facilities, logistics support and
234The U.S. Navy designates ships as "excess" when they have
exceeded seventy-five percent of their service life. Once
designated, excess ships can be leased at no cost to the recipient.
The costs involved in taking a decommissioned ship out of mothballs
is high enough to preclude potential lessee af f ordability . For
example, Argentina was offered the ex-U.S. oiler Ashtabula (AO-51),
but the proposal was turned down because, among other things, the
price of refurbishment was $51 million! From interviews conducted
at OP-613 and OP-615 in September 1991.
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training personnel require additional investments of human
and material resources. 235 Furthermore, the cost to prepare
a mothballed ship for foreign transfer, as calculated by
NAVSEA, considers only the cost of making the ship safe to
sail, not necessarily mission-capable. 236 In other words,
the ship will be able to steam, but may not be able to place
ordnance on target. This means the recipient has to absorb
the further costs of overhauling weapon systems.
Public awareness of ship transfers to the Southern Cone
is probably low. However, the general public may not
support the expenditure of FMS credits to provide warships
to these countries when they realize the recipient costs
involved, and the fact that the region has pressing social
needs and budgetary quandaries. Even if an ABC country
expresses a desire for one of these ships and acknowledges
the hidden costs involved, U.S. policy-makers should
consider that the recipient's scarce monetary resources may
be better employed to solve problems such as poverty,
hunger, disease, and overpopulation. The danger in relating
these types of concerns to the potential recipient is the
possibility of evoking sovereignty concerns.
235Ian Anthony, The Naval Arms Trade (Oxford: Oxford
University, 1990), 165.
"interview with Mr. W.A. Wither, Head, International Programs
Branch, OP-615, 28 September 1991.
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E. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
The issue of technology transfer is a sensitive one for
the United States government. President Bush has used this
concern to preclude the delivery of items that could be used
to further the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 237 Under
the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the United
States and other signatories have agreed to restrict the
trafficking of technologies to the Third World that could be
applied to the development of ballistic missiles capable of
delivering nuclear weapons.
The MTCR does not currently specifically address any of
the technologies found aboard the Adams - and Coontz - or
Knox -class warships. The most sensitive technology
associated with any of these platforms vis-a-vis ballistic
missile technology is the Standard-series surface-to-air
(SAM) missile systems aboard the Adams - and Coontz -class
.
One strategy used by Third World countries seeking to
acquire ballistic missile technology is to convert foreign-
supplied SAM missiles to surface-to-surface (SSM) ballistic
missiles. 238 Under a more restrictive MTCR, proposed by the
Soviet Union in 1989 and analyzed by various U.S. agencies,
the Standard-series SAM systems may be included in the
237See, for example, "Bush Prohibits Sale of Parts For a
Satellite to the Chinese," The New York Times . 01 May 1991, A6.
238See Missile Non-Proliferation; Implications for the United
States Navy , Draft Final Report, Defense Nuclear Agency, 22 January
1990, 11.
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future. 239 By late 1991, however, this proposal had not
received serious U.S. consideration.
Technology transfer has not been a consideration with
regards to the Adams -class ships that have been considered
for foreign transfer to date. The relatively advanced
passive sonar capability in these ships, including the SQR-
15 towed array carried by the Knox -class . is not a
technology-transfer problem either. The main consideration
here is the passive ASW training that would be required by
ABC navy operators in order to effectively use the
equipment. 240 None of the Pentagon nor State Department
officials interviewed felt the technology of these ships
would factor into the transfer decision-making process. 241
In sum, technology transfer is not an important
consideration vis-a-vis the transfer of standard missile and
older generation towed array ships to the Southern Cone.
239Ibid. , B-6.
240Interview with Captain Patrick Roth, OP-613, 10 September
1991, Monterey, California.
241Interviews with John P. Caulfield, Deputy Director Office
of Brazilian Affairs, State Department; Captain Roth, Head OP-613;
Mr. W.A. Wither, Head OP-615; Commander Thomas W. Wilkins, NIPO
ship transfer officer, in Washington, D.C., 26-27 September 1991.
Also, Mr. Mike Cotter, Director, Office of Defense Relations and
Security Assistance, State Department, in Monterey, California, 09
August 1991.
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F. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION TO CHAPTER VIII
This chapter has reviewed the most important potential
disadvantages regarding the transfer of U.S. warships to the
Southern Cone. The possibility of delivered ships being
used against U.S. interests is slim, although the civil-
military relations of each country currently make the
possibility of a future military coup a potentiality.
Should the military assume power, there are elements within
the armed forces of Argentina and Brazil that have expressed
anti-U.S. sentiments. The chance of precipitating an arms
race among the ABC countries, should U.S. ships be
transferred, is slight due to the relatively good relations
the three are currently enjoying. Even though Chile
continues to suspect Argentine intentions, neither of these
two countries, nor Brazil, have economies that can support
an arms race involving warships.
One major problem of transferring ships at the end of
their service life is the significant hidden costs of
operating and maintaining these platforms that will be
absorbed by the recipient. The difficulties associated with
the high pressure steam propulsion plants of these platforms
were a major factor in their decommissioning or transfer to
the fleet reserve. It is logical to expect a Southern Cone
recipient to experience the same or greater degree of
difficulty in keeping them operational. If transferred
ships end up berthed at repair facilities for significant
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stretches of time, it may cause resentment on the part of
the recipient toward the United States. It would also
degrade the potential capability of these navies to serve
U.S. interests.
The economies of the Southern Cone cannot support the
purchase of new warships. This is why these countries shop
the world's used-ship market. It may be that the two- and
three-decade-old U.S. ships are all that they can afford.
Even if leased at no cost, the long-term expense of
operating and maintaining these ships is considerable.
Unfortunately, the social welfare of their populations may
suffer as a result of supporting a navy they cannot afford.
However, U.S. policy-makers would risk insulting a potential
recipient if this concern was used to reject a transfer.
Finally, the issue of technology transfer as it is
contained in the MTCR, does not appear to be a U.S. concern
regarding the delivery of Standard missile ships to the
Southern Cone.
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XX. FUTURE U.S. WARSHIP TRANSFERS
TO THE SOUTHERN CONE s
OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
This chapter will outline three policy options available
to the United States vis-a-vis ship transfers to the
Southern Cone. The ships of concern are the Adams - , Coontz -
and Knox -class . The transfer method of choice is the lease
(Chapter Six). This chapter examines the following policy
options: (a) no future transfers, (b) maximize the number of
ship transfers to the Southern Cone, and (c) emphasize a
steady but low quantity transfer of these ships.
A. POLICY OPTIONS
1. No Future Transfers
U.S. policy-makers who conclude that the
disadvantages of ship transfers to the Southern Cone
outweigh the advantages may decide to not support any future
such transfers. Backers of this option would probably
justify their decision by explaining that first, in light of
the current arms control climate, the U.S. should curtail
its arms transfer programs, especially now that the Soviet
threat has subsided. Second, because the ABC countries face
pressing social and economic dilemmas, scarce budgetary
funds should not be spent on large weapon acquisitions
designed to be employed against a non-existent external
threat. Third, the age of the U.S. ships considered for
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transfer would only result in large, long-term upkeep and
maintenance costs.
2. Maximize Number of Future Transfers
Those that strongly believe the advantages of U.S.
ship transfers to the Southern Cone far outweigh the
disadvantages may support a future policy in which the
United States attempts to maximize the number of such
transfers. Backers of this option would propose that the
U.S. subsidize the reactivation and transfer costs to make
lease of these ships as economically-attractive to the
Southern Cone as possible. They would probably point out
that first, as the U.S. Navy draws down to as few as 325
active ships as early as the year 2000, it is imperative
that other navies, located in regions of interest to the
United States, should be able to employ relatively capable
ships in support of mutual security concerns. Second,
although there is currently minimal conventional extra-
hemispheric security threat to these countries, regional
security threats exist for which naval maritime power could
be employed. Specifically, it is likely that the ABC
militaries will adopt some degree of support for a drug
interdiction mission, especially since their traditional
missions are not garnering civilian support for naval
budgets. Third, should another Soviet-style global maritime
threat develop in the future, the United States would face a
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reconstitution scenario. Ships operated under lease by
friendly ABC navies could be rapidly reassimilated into the
U.S. fleet for employment in distant operational theaters.
Alternatively, the ABC navies could be relied upon to secure
their regional waters, confident that the technology of
these ships would serve them adequately. Last, the transfer
of ships serves to continue to improve naval ties between
supplier and recipient and may even contribute positively to
the consolidation of democracy.
3. Recommended Policy Option:
Periodic Transfer of a Few Vessels
The best option for the United States is to make
available a small number of destroyers and frigates for
lease to the Southern Cone. The United States should
attempt to convince the ABC countries that, despite their
current economic shortfalls, it would be in their best
interest to maintain some blue-water capability. The U.S.
Navy must attempt to counter its own force drawdown by
convincing Congress that ship leases are a long-term
political, military, and security investment that should be
made as economically appealing to the recipient as possible.
Subsidies for reactivation and transfers costs, which are
often prohibitive to potential ABC recipients, would
constitute only a small fraction of the United States'
military and security budgets. The lease of one or two
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ships a year would allow U.S. security interests to be
served while minimizing the economic disadvantages of ship
transfers
.
This policy would reinforce the concept of a united
Western Hemisphere in which a predominant United States
coordinates and encourages military and economic
interrelationships. The breakup of the world into regional
trading blocs may require the U.S. to protect its dominant
Western Hemisphere role against external threats. Only with
close military, political, and economic ties within the
hemisphere, especially between the United States and the
large ABC powers, can the hemisphere's cohesiveness be
maintained. Along with economic programs such as the
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI), the transfer
of warships to the Southern Cone would be a positive step
toward enhancing hemispheric maritime security and naval
relationships
.
In sum, the advantages outweigh the disadvantages of
ship transfers to the Southern Cone. Economic troubles and
military cutbacks in the Southern Cone make ship leases the
most viable method of sustaining long-term ABC naval
capabilities. Although these ships are old, they are still
capable of serving both U.S. and Southern Cone security
interests. Reactivation and transfer costs, however,
precludes the transfer of a large number of these ships.
166
X . CONCLUSION
The introduction addressed a number of matters related to
the transfer to the Argentina, Brazil, and Chile of Adams -
.
Coontz - . and Knox-class warships. Those matters include
(1) whether these ships are actually needed by the ABC
navies; (2) what ship transfer method should be employed;
(3) analyzing the pros and cons of transferring these ships
to the Southern Cone; and (4) options for future U.S. ship
transfer policy. This chapter will capsulize the findings
for each issue and address areas for further research.
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
1. Needs of the ABC Navies
The geopolitical security interests of each of the
ABC countries mandates a viable blue-water capability. Due
to economic difficulties, naval budgets have been reduced
over the past decade. As a result, warship acquisitions
have been minimal. Also, the Soviet Union has subsided as
the region's main external security threat, making it more
difficult for these navies to justify ship procurements.
Nevertheless, each of these countries has other security
interests that require viable blue-water navies. A weighted
factor-analysis method was use to determine ship types
desired by Southern Cone navies. Each ABC navy has a
significant need for guided-missile destroyers and frigates.
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2. Ship Transfer Methods
The costs to the ABC countries of FMS sales and
coproduction are prohibitive; these are not viable future
transfer methods. The lease of excess U.S. vessels, the
only method studied in this thesis, is the most viable
method for transferring ships to Argentina, Brazil, and
Chile, and is the cheapest way for these countries to build
their force structure with relatively sophisticated
warships. Additionally, leased ships can be recalled into
the U.S. fleet in a reconstitution scenario.
3. Advantages and Disadvantages of Ship Transfers
To the Southern Cone
The advantages of transferring these ships to the
Southern Cone include the fact that U.S. and Southern Cone
security interests overlap. The United States and the ABC
nations have security interests in Antarctica and the South
Atlantic and South Pacific oceans. Drug interdiction,
already a U.S. security interest and a mission of the U.S.
Navy, is becoming a security issue for the ABC countries.
Lacking a traditional external security mission to justify
their budgets, these navies may soon adopt drug interdiction
as a primary mission area. If so, they could be encouraged
to supplement U.S. Navy operations. The Adams - . Coontz -
.
and Knox -class ships have the ability to perform sustained
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drug interdiction operations and each has significant
surface and air detection capability.
Other advantages of ship transfers are the positive
influences they would have on U.S. industry and the
consolidation of ABC democracy. Finally, transfers would
enhance the military and political ties between the major
powers of North and South America.
The greatest potential disadvantage of transfers is
the current social and economic woes of these countries.
Opponents may argue that scarce fiscal resources would be
better spent on non-military programs.
4. Options for U.S. Ship Transfer Policy
to the Southern Cone
There are basically three future transfer options:
(1) no future transfers; (2) a maximum number of transfers,
reminiscent of U.S. policy following World War Two; and
(3) a limited number of future transfers. This thesis
concludes that option three maximizes the advantages while
minimizing the economic impact, on both the U.S. and the
Southern Cone, of future ship transfers. It is recommended
that the United States look into subsidizing the
reactivation and transfer costs of these ships to make the
transfers more economical for the ABC countries.
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B. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This thesis raises several related issues pertaining to
future ship transfers. First, should each ABC country be
given equal opportunity to lease these ships? What criteria
should be used to rank recipients? It is certainly possible
to transfer ships to all three countries, but policy-makers
may want to use the transfers as incentives and rewards for
adopting pro-U.S. global political, environmental, and
economic policies.
Second, with the almost certain degradation of U.S. ship-
making capacity as domestic orders dwindle, what is the
possibility of building ships and submarines for export?
Although the ABC countries would probably not be potential
customers, other countries have expressed interest in new,
U.S. -made vessels. There is a need to discover if there is
a viable way to produce sophisticated warships for export
without transferring critical production technology.
Last, there is a need to study the feasibility for a
hemispheric military organization. Historical attempts at
Western Hemisphere military alliances have ultimately
failed, but there seems to be a need for a military
counterpart to the hemispheric free trade zone described in
the EAI. With an uncertain economic future in light of the
advancement of the European and Asiatic trade blocs, and
with a drawback of U.S. forward-deployed forces in Western
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Europe and the Far East, it may be time for the United
States to refocus its attention towards Latin America.
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